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EDITOR’S NOTE

J

udges share many common problems, goals, experiences, and interests.
That's why professional associations like the American Judges
Association and its journal, Court Review, have a purpose.
With that in mind, I'd like to ask for your help. Let us know what you'd
like to read about on these pages. Suggest a topic—or an author. You can
reach me at lebens@kscourts.org, and I'd very much appreciate your thoughts.
This issue starts with an article identifying three targets of opportunity for
the improvement of any court: clarify the vision, foster a public-service mentality, and get everyone involved. Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson, and Kevin
Burke focus on how to have a high-performance court.
Two articles focus on considerations of procedural fairness. Nicholas Woolf
and Jennifer Yim describe the courtroom-observation program now in place
in Utah. Trained observers—vetted by the Utah Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission—observe judges on
the bench. The Utah observers have been
specifically instructed to observe the extent to
which each judge observes accepted norms for
procedural fairness. The Utah program presumes that procedural-fairness principles are
relevant for all courts, but, in a separate article, Victor Flango challenges that premise. He
suggests that these concepts may not apply to
all courts and that court staff may need to play
the procedural-fairness role in some dockets.
Elizabeth Neeley's article focuses on how
one state has attempted to counter the underrepresentation of minorities on
its jury panels. She reviews the thorough work done in Nebraska, not only
providing details of those efforts but also suggesting ways in which other
states and courts may address this issue.
Our final article comes from Judge David Admire, who served as a visiting
professional at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He tells us
about his experience there and about the organization and early work of the
court.
We're at work on some interesting future issues. One will explore the issues
involved in eyewitness testimony. We'll also have our usual coverage this fall
of the past year's United States Supreme Court decisions. And each issue
closes with the Resource Page, which notes various items of interest to judges.
Please let us know what else you'd like to see on the pages of Court
Review.—Steve Leben
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President’s Column
Making Better Judges™
Kevin S. Burke

R

obert F. Kennedy once said, “There is a Chinese curse
which says, ‘May he live in interesting times.’ Like it or
not we live in interesting times. They are times of danger and uncertainty; but they are also more open to the creative
energy of men than any other time in history. And everyone
here will ultimately be judged—will ultimately judge himself—
on the effort he has contributed to building a new world society and the extent to which his ideals and goals have shaped
that effort.”
There is little doubt that the judges in the
United States and Canada “live in interesting
times.” We face three enormous challenges:
First, there is the budget. From California to
British Columbia, the courts have seen a serious
erosion of court funding. What has happened
there is devastating, but not being as bad off as
those courts is hardly acceptable. In part, lack of
funding explains the membership challenge the
American Judges Association faces. Many courts
no longer pay for memberships in organizations
like the American Judges Association or the
National Association for Court Management. Despite our
claim to the mantra: Voice of the Judiciary®, AJA isn’t going to
single-handedly fix court funding. AJA must offer a reason for
judges to spend their own money to be an AJA member.
The second challenge of these interesting times is courthouse morale. Judges and court employees are increasingly not
feeling appreciated. The judiciary must be committed to building a strong organization, which then and only then can create
the environment for courts to be an effective branch of government. While courts cannot unilaterally fix the budget, judges
can exercise the leadership that creates good morale and organizational excellence.
The judiciary cannot be an effective branch of government if
judges’ vision of sharing power with each other is no better
than an office-sharing arrangement of solo practitioner lawyers
whose practice specialty is being a judge. Professor Doris
Marie Provine put it this way: “The basic problem, crudely put,
is that judges don’t want to govern themselves, but they don’t
want anyone else to do it either.” The American Judges
Association has much to contribute in meeting this challenge.
In our publications, website, blog, and conferences, the

American Judges Association is uniquely situated to address
courthouse morale, leadership, and change.
The third challenge judges face is the legitimacy of our decisions. That challenge may be the most serious. For reasons not
wholly the fault of the judiciary, there is a skepticism about
government that, while not presently focused on courts, needs
to be addressed. Regardless of their attitudes toward the other
branches of government, people need to have confidence in
their courts.
Legitimacy is in part about building a reservoir
of goodwill so that when the inevitable unpopular decision is made, people trust that the judges
are trying their best. People need to trust their
judges. The American Judges Association made a
significant contribution toward making better
judges and building stronger legitimacy for courts
when the White Paper on Procedural Fairness
was adopted, but the real work occurred after the
paper. Thousands of judges have participated in
educational programs featuring the concepts of
procedural fairness first articulated in the AJA
White Paper. AJA is prepared to offer more with the upcoming
White Paper and conference presentation at our conference this
fall on Minding the Court: Improving the Decision Process and
Increasing Procedural Fairness.
The American Judges Association needs to focus on making
better judges and is positioned to do that. But to paraphrase
Robert Kennedy, everyone here will ultimately be judged—and
will judge himself or herself—on the effort we each contribute. The AJA needs vibrant membership contributions
but, more importantly, the judiciary needs vibrant contributions by individual judges. Building a strong multinational
judicial organization is not for the fainthearted. But it can be
done. Contribute to the AJA blog (http://blog.amjudges.org/);
offer to write a lengthier piece for Court Review; send me an
email with advice or ask me to share your thoughts with the
membership.
It is a great privilege to be president of AJA, but it is even a
greater privilege to be a part of a time when we can make AJA
stronger and we can make courts stronger. Let us recommit the
American Judges Association to a new and brighter future of
making better judges.
Court Review - Volume 47 79

Creating a New
Generation of Courts
Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson, & Kevin Burke

C

ourts are under ever-increasing pressure to be more
transparent and accountable. Regardless of whether this
is driven by fiscal crises, policy makers’ concerns, or
simple public outcry, a common question is, “What are courts
doing to be efficient and effective?” If you are not careful, you
might think a court is just another public body, like an executive agency, which public-administration experts want to reengineer.
Some judges understandably are resistant to developing
their administrative side because—on the surface—managerial
values clash with what judges know well and are trained to do:
they make decisions and issue orders in individual cases after
purposeful deliberation. The role of effective administration in
running a court is a topic absent from any law-school curriculum and is missing from many judicial education and training
programs. On-the-job training certainly gives you experience,
but there are limitations in any learn-as-you-go approach to
training.
In this short article, we seek to draw a closer connection
between the administration of the legal process in trial courts
and how well the legal process serves individual litigants. The
thesis is that the nature of court administration affects procedural due process. Advocacy is advanced in courts that make
known to attorneys and parties what is going to happen, when,
why, and how at all critical stages of the process. To develop
and sustain these connections, court personnel at all levels
should strive to enhance three areas of administration.
First, judges and staff members should aim to articulate
clearly what kind of court they want to own and offer to their
community. Court leaders play a critical role in encouraging
this discussion when they point out to every judge and staff
member that good courts are not just tidy; they enable opposing parties and their attorneys to argue their respective sides
effectively.
Second, a key perspective for improving operations overall
is the recognition that the interests, values, and rights of all
participants in the legal process are court responsibilities.
Courts deliver services, and participants in the legal process
are like valued customers. Fairness is desired by everyone,
with court customers wanting this result through a process
that is predictable, timely, and cost-effective.
Third, organizing and mobilizing judges and court staff
members around court improvement is a process requiring
attention, patience, and compromise. Developing collegial
support and making new approaches a reality inevitably bring
into focus problems and possible solutions involving sharp differences of opinion among judges and administrators about
what, if anything, needs to be done. Even if a presiding judge
champions a course of action, it does not necessarily mean the
plan will be fully enacted. And if acceptance is reached, it is
not uncommon for objections to be raised again and previ80 Court Review - Volume 47

ously settled issues scuttled or threatened. In the court world,
the idea that the few can consistently command the abiding
support of the many is a dubious expectation.
Knowing what courts want to be, focusing on customers,
and building support for making changes are ways to uplift
every court and, perhaps more important, to form a structure
the courts can continue to use in addressing future challenges.
The High Performance Court Framework developed by the
National Center for State Courts is a key resource for judges
and staff members to draw on because it addresses ideas to promote and implement enduring reform in the ordinary administration of justice. The framework suggests a series of flexible
steps every court can take to improve its performance.
Achieving High Performance: A Framework for Courts is available at: www.ncsc.org/hpc.
THREE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

Roscoe Pound noted that one root cause of the popular dissatisfaction with the American justice system is the belief that
the administration of justice is simple—anyone can do it. For
those of us who are involved in court administration, we know
it isn’t always easy. Sometimes the difficulty comes from not
fully answering some basic questions: What are we trying to
do, for whom, and by whom? Below are three strategies court
leaders should consider to build and sustain effective administration, and perhaps make the tasks just a little bit easier.
CLARIFY THE VISION

Someone once said the difference between a vision and a hallucination is simply how many people see it. Thus, court leaders need to provide a comprehensive vision for their court that
a significant number of judges and other court staff will
embrace and buy into. Setting and communicating a leadership
vision statement is a critically important and deeply strategic
activity that many court leaders fail to do adequately. It may
seem like a simple activity for the court executive team to share
a strategic vision of where they would like their court to go and
of the obstacles that must be overcome to get there, but this is
no self-executing task. Time is needed to make a vision explicit
to everyone who works in the courthouse. For a statement to be
more than words, judges and court staff must see how the statement’s provisions direct the daily work they carry out.
There are those who argue that superior achievement is possible if and only if a true visionary charismatically convinces
others to change their practices by adopting new and better
ways of doing things. Inspirational leadership is surely a helpful ingredient to achieving high performance. But making
improvements in a court is not dependent on the singlehanded leadership of one person. Even courts with charismatically challenged leadership can be successful. The loosely
coupled nature of courts means leadership is a matter of per-

suasion, bringing people together, and setting a tone. A feeling
that “the leader cares about us, listens to us, and deeply cares
about the court as an institution” is far more important than
charisma. Building a culture based on mutual trust, collaboration, and commitment to solid administrative practices can
serve to restrain strong egos. Arriving at a culture conducive to
high performance is a challenge involving consensus of the
entire bench, not something that can be forced on judges even
by an inspirational leader.

increase the sense of procedural fairness, social-science
research suggests that compliance with court orders will
increase as a byproduct.2 Court leaders should give explicit
attention to the concept of procedural fairness, the mantra
being, “Every litigant has a right to be listened to, to be treated
with respect, and to understand why the decision was made.”
Ensuring that each individual receives his or her day in court
connects administration with due process.
GET EVERYONE INVOLVED

TREAT COURT ADMINISTRATION AS PUBLIC SERVICE

A high-performance court strives to give attention to the
interests and rights of all individuals involved in the legal
process. Customer satisfaction is a priority.
The term “customer” is new to many courts, but it captures
the basic idea that people entering the courthouse react to both
the services delivered and the manner of delivery. A strong
public-service ethic is apparent when courts are readily accessible and exhibit fair processes in all court proceedings. People
respond well to being treated with courtesy and respect.
This point of view has a long history, with Alexander
Hamilton’s observation on the importance of providing effective administration of civil and criminal justice being a classic
statement:
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the
province of the State governments, . . . [by which] I
mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil
justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most
universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which . . . contributes,
more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon
the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.1
State courts are certainly one of the institutions Hamilton
had in mind in making this claim. And the concern is clear: the
images people have of the administration of justice in general
and courts in particular affect their support of and trust in government.
Creating a positive image for state courts requires care
because virtually all individual court customers have some
degree of uncertainty about the legal process. This is particularly true of self-represented parties. As a result, a high-performance court tries to reduce confusion by making itself accessible, providing clear information, and adhering to predictable,
orderly, and timely proceedings.
Hamilton’s insight is supported by modern research findings. Positive perceptions of a court are shaped more by how
people feel they were treated than by the outcomes of their
cases. Satisfaction with the process is mostly shaped by
whether customers believe their rights and interests are taken
into account in the resolution of disputes. If a court can

Footnotes
1. Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST, No. 17, at 88 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999).
2. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT.
REV. 26 (2007-08); Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, The Evolution of

The ability to adapt successfully to new ways of doing business is strengthened when everyone understands the court’s
vision and is properly aligned to achieve it. A sign of a healthy
court is that court staff members are viewed as active partners
with judges and senior managers.
Each part of the court troika—judges, professional administrators, and line staff—works more effectively when it understands and appreciates the role of the other two. In her book,
Team of Rivals, Doris Kearns Goodwin described Abraham
Lincoln as a man with an extraordinary ability to put himself
in the place of other men to experience what they were feeling
and to understand their motives and desires.3 The ability of
court leaders to marshal everyone’s talent is a key ingredient to
high-performance success, although leadership qualities like
Lincoln’s understandably are rare. Employees can help find
ways to sustain areas of high performance (e.g., documenting
successful approaches for managing case files) and ways to
improve areas of less-than-successful performance (e.g., spending more time improving customer service at the counter).
Because staff members often have regular contact with the
public, many have a refined sense of what aspects of current
service delivery lead to dissatisfaction.
Active listening reveals competing ideas on how best to
solve particular problems. As difficult as it may be, court leaders need to recognize that there are alternative paths to a
desired goal. Good court leaders are careful when there is a
close vote among judges. A close vote may indicate it is time to
go back to the drawing board and refine the alternatives. The
best court leaders willingly accept a collective choice that will
bring about the desired outcome better or more easily than
their most preferred options—even if it does not appear on
paper to be the best.
Acceptance of alternatives builds trust and enables cooperative communication. Judges and staff members need not fear
that administrative discussions are merely forums used to foist
practices upon them.
MOVING FORWARD

Systematic feedback evaluates the implementation of the
three strategies. And establishing measures of performance is a
way to organize the categories of feedback. Performance
results, in turn, are an interpretable basis for everyone to judge

the Trial Judge from Counting Case Dispositions to a Commitment to
Fairness, 18 WIDENER L.J. 397, 404-08 (2009).
3. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005).
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how well a court is doing. By circulating results that revolve
around customer satisfaction, court leaders demonstrate the
sort of respect and rectitude Hamilton believed attracted public support.
Court leaders and a cadre of judges and senior managers
can facilitate sharing results by first having the conversation
internally. Because results are subject to interpretation, an
opportunity to review and comment provides a forum for fair
debate, to reconcile divergent points of view, and to develop
presentation methods able to withstand scrutiny. Openness
shapes a court’s accountability environment, and it can both
set the terms of discussion with funding sources and promote
a more healthy review by everyone of court progress and
resources.
Brian Ostrom is a principal court research consultant with the National Center for State
Courts. He has extensive training and experience in performance evaluation and in using a
wide range of qualitative and quantitative
analysis techniques to understand and overcome problems in the courts. His main research
interests since joining the National Center for
State Courts in 1989 have included the study of felony sentencing
and the development of structured sentencing systems, civil justice
reform, the methodology of judge and staff workload assessment,
and court organizational development and performance assessment. Ostrom has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of
Washington.
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Roger Hanson is engaged in legal research for
the purpose of legal reform. Hanson has previously been a senior researcher at the National
Center for State Courts and more recently has
served as a courts consultant. His past work
includes assisting the Right Honourable the
Lord Woolf in his report of civil justice in
England and Wales; Hanson has also worked in
Afghanistan and the Phillipines as well as in American state and
federal courts. Hanson has a Ph.D. in political science from the
University of Minnesota, and he serves as an adjunct professor in
law and political science at the University of Colorado.
Kevin Burke has been a state trial judge in
Minneapolis since 1984 and presently serves as
president of the American Judges Association.
He coauthored the AJA’s 2007 white paper on
procedural fairness, and he regularly lectures
judges throughout the United States and
Canada on procedural fairness, court leadership, and other topics. Burke has served four
terms as chief judge of the 62-judge Hennepin County District
Court, and he received the William H. Rehnquist Award from the
National Center for State Courts in 2003, an award presented
annually to the state judge who most exemplifies the highest level
of judicial excellence, integrity, fairness, and professional ethics.
Burke received his law degree from the University of Minnesota.

THE AJA’S 2012 ANNUAL EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE

INNOVATIVE JUDGING
The Sheraton New Orleans
September 30-October 5, 2012
The AJA Annual Education Conference always presents the best judicial education available anywhere,
and this year we’ll be collaborating with the
Louisiana judiciary. Our educational programs are
accredited for continuing judicial education and feature faculty experts who have demonstrated an ability
to engage their audience.
You’ll be at a great hotel located on Canal Street
immediately across from the French Quarter, and
you’ll have a chance to interact with judges from
throughout the United States and Canada.

SUNDAY, SEPT. 30

AJA committee meetings in the day, an opening reception for all attendees in the evening.
MONDAY, OCT. 1

The day starts with the traditional Red Mass on Law Day at the St. Louis Cathedral with the Louisiana
judiciary. The afternoon is full of educational sessions, including Dean Erwin Chemerinsky’s annual
review of the past year’s United States Supreme Court decisions.
TUESDAY, OCT. 2

We have a full day of educational programs. Topics include new approaches to procedural fairness and
judicial decision making, issues in child-custody cases, handling journalist inquiries, issues in civil
cases, and handling pro se protective-order hearings.

WEDNESDAY, OCT. 3

Another full day of educational programming brings you experts on innovative approaches to community justice, a primer on courts and media, and sessions on handling drugged-driving cases, how to
effectively use high-intensity probation supervision, and how to handle domestic-violence cases. The
day ends with an evening reception with local judges at the Riverview Room—on the fourth floor of
the Jackson Brewery.
THURSDAY, OCT. 4

Sample the AJA’s business meetings, then take some time to tour New Orleans
before the conference-closing dinner.
For the full conference schedule and registration information, go to the AJA website.

The Courtroom-Observation Program
of the Utah Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission
Nicholas H. Woolf & Jennifer MJ Yim

T

he State of Utah has recently introduced several innovations to its judicial performance evaluation program.
Since the 1960s, such programs have been used in a growing number of states to inform decisions about judicial retention and to provide feedback to judges about their performance. The evaluations have traditionally been limited to surveys completed by a variety of stakeholders in the court system. But several states have begun to expand the scope of their
evaluation programs beyond surveys, and one of these innovations is to observe judges in their courtrooms.
Utah has developed its courtroom-observation program to
become a major component of its overall judicial performance
evaluation. This article describes the history of judicial performance evaluations in Utah, the introduction of courtroom
observation by lay observers, and the recent innovations to the
observation program, including its focus on procedural fairness, use of qualitative evaluation methods, and use of systematic content analysis of the observers’ narrative reports.

BACKGROUND TO THE UTAH COURTROOM-OBSERVATION PROGRAM

History of Judicial Performance Evaluation
Judicial performance evaluation (JPE) has steadily grown in
popularity since the first program in Alaska in 1967.1 In 1985,
the American Bar Association issued its first guidelines for JPE,
and by 1998 “approximately 23 states had some sort of JPE program in place or under development.”2 In 2005, the American
Bar Association updated its JPE guidelines, proposing that all
court systems implement a formal program to promote judicial
self-improvement, enhance the quality of the judiciary, and pro-

The authors would like to thank David Roth, Joanne Slotnik, and David
Turner for their constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
Footnotes
1. Richard C. Kearney, Judicial Performance Evaluation in the States,
22 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 468 (Winter 1999).
2. Id. at. 471.
3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, LAWYERS
CONFERENCE, ABA BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/conferences/lawyers_
conference/resources/judicial_performance_resources.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2012).
4. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to
Enhance Judicial Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public
Trust, 86 DENVER U. L. REV. 115 (2008).
5. Id. at.155-56.
6. E.g., AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY—WASHINGTON CHAPTER,
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EVALUATION,
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vide relevant information to voters. These guidelines provide
evaluative criteria in five areas (legal ability, integrity and
impartiality, communication skills, professionalism and temperament, and administrative capacity), and suggest various
aspects of evaluation design, including evaluating actual behaviors rather than the general qualities of judges, collecting data
from multiple sources, and using experts for developing evaluation methods and for collecting and analyzing data.3
It is not clear that these guidelines have uniformly been followed, and David Brody has proposed a nationwide assessment
of the processes currently in use in JPE programs.4 One issue
seems clear from the JPE literature: reliance on surveys that
result in a single metric of performance does not promote
acceptance and trust of JPE by judges.5 While some studies of
JPE programs find that that judges have predominantly positive comments about JPE, including the usefulness of feedback
and the appropriateness of criteria,6 other studies document
judicial mistrust of survey-based JPE. In a Colorado study,
while judges reported positive comments about JPE, many criticized the survey methodology used as “unscientific” and
“inherently flawed.” 7 Another study found that some JPE surveys appear to be “a fishing expedition trolling about for evidence of judicial misbehavior or performance problems”8
rather than an evaluation of clear performance standards.
Analyses of survey data show that respondents tend to evaluate female and minority judges more harshly9 and that aggregating scores across a wide variety of criteria, or using a single
measure for different kinds of courts, reduces the validity of
the survey results.10 Concerns with survey methodologies provide one explanation for the slow adoption of JPE.11

FINAL REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION PILOT PROJECT 29 (2002); KEVIN M. ESTERLING &
KATHELEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS
IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 39 (American
Judicature Society 1998).
7. Brody, supra note 4, at 147.
8. Kearney, supra note 1, at 484.
9. Rebecca Wood, Sylvia R. Lazos & Mallory Waters, Sacrificing
Diversity for “Quality”: How Judicial Performance Evaluations
Are Failing Women & Minorities, Scholarly Works, Paper 24 (Apr.
5, 2010), http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/24/.
10. Rebecca Gill & Sylvia R. Lazos, Reflections in Response to the
Nevada Judicial Evaluation Pilot Project, Working Paper Series,
Abstract No. 1539825 (Dec. 18, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539825.
11. Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1375 (2001).

In response to these concerns, some states have broadened
their JPE programs to include reviews of case-management
records, solicitation of public comments, or interviews with
judges.12 Several states also have courtroom-observation programs of various kinds. In Alaska, an independent organization trains volunteers to observe courtroom proceedings, complete surveys, and write narrative comments, a selection of
which are reproduced in a report to the Alaska Judicial Council
and included as input to the JPE process.13 Citizen organizations in both New York and Minnesota, neither of which have
state JPE programs, train volunteers to conduct courtroom
monitoring as outsiders to the legal system; these organizations publicize their reports and recommendations to the public and the court system.14 Colorado has multiple JPE commissions by geographic jurisdiction, and courtroom observation is
conducted by the JPE commission members themselves, who
receive training in collecting various sources of data for their
evaluations. In Nevada, a 2010 ballot measure to establish a
comprehensive JPE program included a formal courtroomobservation program, but the measure was defeated.
History of the Utah Courtroom-Observation Program
Since 1986, the Utah State Courts have conducted JPEs for
state-court judges. However, in 2008, the Utah State
Legislature passed the Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission Act,15 altering the judicial-retention process by
moving responsibility for JPE from Utah’s judicial branch to a
newly created, independent Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission (JPEC). The statute was based on the work of the
Judicial Retention Election Task Force, which was composed
of legislators and judges. The task force met for approximately
six months to produce draft legislation, receiving input from
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal
System at the University of Denver regarding JPE efforts across
the nation.
By statute, Utah’s JPEC is composed of 13 volunteer members, four appointed by each branch of government, and a final
member who is the executive director of the Governor’s
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. The statute sets
members’ terms, limits the number of attorneys, balances
political-party affiliations, precludes sitting legislators and sitting judges from membership, and creates an executive-director position to staff the commission. The statute covers all
state, county, and municipal judges (county and municipal

courts are known collectively in Utah as justice courts). Utah
judges are appointed either by the state’s governor, county government, or a municipal appointing authority, and all face
uncontested retention elections at the conclusion of their
terms. Two important purposes of the new JPEC were to provide Utah voters with meaningful and independent information about judges and to provide for retention recommendations from JPEC during retention elections.
The statute requires JPEC to complete a JPE twice during
each six-year term of office for all sitting judges: once at
midterm and again near the end of term in preparation for the
retention election.16 Each JPE must include a judicial performance survey, courtroom observation, and a review of judicial
disciplinary records. The statute sets minimum performance
standards, makes requirements about the publication and
availability of evaluation data, and specifies required survey
respondent groups and survey categories.
As noted, the statute mandates the creation of a courtroomobservation program, and requires JPEC to “make rules concerning the conduct of courtroom observation” with respect to
who may perform observations, whether they are to be completed in person or electronically, and the principles and standards used to evaluate the observed behaviors.17 While the
statute is specific about the details of the survey design and
implementation, the legislature required JPEC to determine
both the details of the courtroom-observation program and
how the resulting information should be used in formulating
judicial-retention recommendations.
In its first effort, JPEC developed an observation survey
instrument similar to the survey instrument completed by
attorneys. JPEC recruited and trained volunteer observers who
observed judges in court, scored judges on the survey questions, and added comments as they thought appropriate.
Results closely mimicked the survey results and generated no
new information. Additionally, JPEC members worried that an
observation survey based on a small sample size of about five
observers per judge was fraught with reliability concerns.
To glean different information from that available in its surveys, JPEC changed its approach in two major ways. First, the
courtroom-observation program focused exclusively on procedural fairness.18 Second, the observation instrument elicited
qualitative rather than quantitative information.
The focus on procedural fairness recognized the well-established yet counterintuitive body of social-science research that

12. Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial
Performance Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90
JUDICATURE 200 (2007).
13. For the most recent report of the independent citizen organization,
Alaska Judicial Observers, Inc., on its in-court observations of
Alaska judges, see Alaska Judicial Observers, 2010 Biennial Report,
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent2010/judobse10.pdf.
14. The Fund for Modern Courts in New York has been training volunteers to observe judges and publicly report their observations
since 1975. Recent reports may be found at http://www.modern
courts.org/Programs/monitoring.html. A group in Minnesota,
called WATCH, indicates on its website that it has trained volunteers to observe court hearings in Hennepin County, Minnesota.

See http://www.watchmn.org/.
15. 2008 Utah Laws ch. 248, § 5, codified at Utah Code Ann. 78A-12201.
16. Utah Supreme Court judges serve ten-year terms and so receive
two midterm evaluations and a retention-election evaluation. The
courtro om-observation component is currently administered for
all Utah judges except appellate level judges and part-time justicecourt judges.
17. 2008 Utah Laws ch. 248, § 7, codified at Utah Code Ann.78A-12203(3).
18. We consider the terms procedural justice and procedural fairness to
be synonymous, and for consistency use the term procedural fairness throughout.
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has developed over the last 20 years.19 The central conclusion
of this research is that people are strongly influenced by their
judgments of how fairly they are treated by authorities of all
kinds, including courts and judges. Their trust in the law and
their voluntary acceptance of judges’ decisions are more
strongly influenced by their judgment of the fairness of the
procedures and their treatment than by the favorability of the
outcome they receive in court. The research does not in any
way suggest that the desirability of achieving a party’s outcome
is not of great concern, but rather emphasizes the particular
importance people place upon fair procedures and fair treatment. The behavior of judges has a central role in producing
perceptions of procedural fairness. Consequently, JPEC
decided to focus the courtroom-observation portion of the JPE
on this important area.
The decision to adopt qualitative methods was important
too. Quantitative methods, such as those used in surveys, produce information in different ways from qualitative methods,
and the two methods complement one another to generate a
more complete picture of what is being evaluated. Surveys collect structured information from respondents about clearly
defined descriptions of behaviors (e.g., the judge properly
applies the rules of civil procedure), and measure responses in
statistically valid ways. In contrast, qualitative evaluations seek
unstructured information about behavior in its natural context
(e.g., the narrative comments about judicial behaviors written
by courtroom observers), without specifying in advance
exactly what those behaviors might be. JPEC decided that
because context was so important to evaluating proceduralfairness behaviors, qualitative methods would be most appropriate for the courtroom-observation program.
To provide a systematic analysis of the qualitative courtroom-observation data, and to produce careful summaries of
the large amount of information that would be produced by
observers, JPEC hired an outside consultant with expertise in
qualitative-evaluation research to conduct a pilot study of
five judges.20 For each judge in the pilot study, the consultant
prepared a content analysis of the judge’s courtroom-observer
narratives and a summary report presenting the analysis in a
concise format.21 After completion, JPEC staff and the
Courtroom Observation Subcommittee chairperson visited
each of the five judges to solicit feedback both on the results
of the pilot study and on the observation program more generally. JPEC concluded from the positive responses to the
pilot study that the summary reports were effective in
enhancing the credibility of the courtroom-observation data
and so decided to incorporate content analyses into the program.22

JPEC consequently adopted administrative rules to codify
the details of the courtroom-observation program,23 including
the selection and terms of service of observers, the required
training, the numbers of observations per judge, and the minimum time spent observing each courtroom. The rule also
established procedural-fairness principles as the basis for the
observers’ evaluations.

19. For a comprehensive discussion of the importance of procedural
fairness, see the special issue of Court Review, comprising the first
two issues of Volume 44 (2007-08), which is available on the web
at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr44-1/CR44-1-2.pdf.
20. The first author of this article, Nicholas H. Woolf, is the qualitative-research consultant who conducted the pilot study and is
conducting the 2012-2014 content analyses and preparation of
summary reports.
21. Further information about the content analysis and summary

report appears below in the section, “Current Program.”
22. Further information about feedback from the five pilot study
judges to their summary reports appears below in the section,
“Uses of Courtroom-Observation Reports.”
23. Utah Admin. Code R597-3-3.
24. The second author of this article, Jennifer MJ Yim, is the vicechairperson of JPEC, appointed by the governor, and is the past
chairperson of the Courtroom Observation Subcommittee.
25. Utah Admin. Code R597-3-3.
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THE CURRENT COURTROOM-OBSERVATION PROGRAM

The courtroom-observation program is coordinated by a
part-time JPEC staff person, and overseen by JPEC’s advisory
Courtroom Observation Subcommittee.24 This section
describes the recruitment and training of observers, the observation procedures, and the content analysis and summarization of the observation data.
Observer Recruitment and Training
Recruitment. JPEC seeks volunteers with a “broad and varied range of life experiences” who can commit to a one-year
renewable term of service.25 The coordinator recruits volunteers using a statewide advertising and public-outreach effort
that taps local media, continuing-education programs, and
government and nonprofit organizations. JPEC staff and commission members provide an orientation, and screen applicants based on written applications and an interview process.
JPEC excludes those lacking basic computer skills or access,
those involved in pending litigation in the state, and convicted
felons. Those with professional involvement in the courts and
certain types of relationships with judges or the courts are also
automatically ineligible. During 2011, JPEC had 28 volunteer
courtroom observers who produced 330 courtroom-observation reports for 65 judges.
Training. Over time, JPEC has developed a thorough training program for volunteer observers. Initial training includes
an orientation about the overall evaluation process of which
courtroom observation is a part; a primer on levels of court and
court process; confidentiality, nondisclosure, and conflict-ofinterest requirements; an introduction to the principles and
standards of procedural fairness; and technical instruction on
the data-collection process, including proper use of the courtroom-observation instrument. Some sections are taught by
commission members, some by JPEC staff, and some by senior
judges or court administrators. Initial training includes practice observations and mentoring opportunities with experienced observers. Periodic in-service trainings and other meetings, such as Ask-a-Judge sessions with senior judges and
events with commission members, help to ensure ongoing
effective observations and volunteer retention.

Observation Procedures
By administrative rule, a minimum of four different volunteers observe each judge for both the midterm and end-of-term
evaluations. To date, JPEC has provided almost all judges with
five observations, both at midterm and end of term. Each
observer observes a judge in person for a minimum of two
hours while the judge is actively on the bench. Observations
may be completed in one sitting or over several courtroom visits, after which the observer completes the data-collection
instrument and submits it electronically to JPEC staff. The
identity of the observer is withheld from the judge, JPEC commissioners, and the public. However, JPEC staff records information about who conducted the observation (by observer
code), the dates and type of proceedings observed, and the
gender of the observer.
The data-collection instrument is narrative-based, instructing the observer to report his or her experiences in the courtroom with respect to the procedural-fairness principles of neutrality, respect, and voice, and to report other notable aspects
of the observation experience, including whether they found
the judge to be trustworthy, whether they would feel comfortable appearing before the judge as a litigant, and whether the
judge was aware of the observation. Trainers instruct observers
to write detailed, contextually specific narratives that articulate: (1) the behaviors they observed, and (2) the observer’s
personal reaction to those behaviors. Observers report that
compiling their notes into comprehensive narratives requires
several hours of work beyond the time spent in the courtroom.
Content Analysis and Summarization of Observation Data
Criteria. The consultant first developed a set of evaluative
criteria for analyzing the observers’ narratives. These criteria
describe the judicial behaviors that lead people to believe they
have been treated fairly in the courtroom. The criteria are
based on the “four key procedural fairness principles,”26 i.e.,
whether recipients feel that they have been given voice, have
been treated with neutrality and respect, and experience trust in
the judge and the legal system. The consultant reviewed the
procedural-fairness literature and identified approximately 50
judicial behaviors that have been proposed to lead those in the
courtroom to experience (or not experience) procedural fairness. These were clustered into 20 criteria, which were

26. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 30
(2007-08).
27. While trust is one of the four principles of procedural fairness,
there is no group of criteria called trust, nor any individual criterion called trust. From the perspective of evaluating performance
behaviors, we consider trust an outcome of respect, neutrality and
voice, rather than a behavior in itself. Some observers reported
difficulty in assessing behaviors themselves as “trustworthy.”
Similarly, researchers in the management field listed behaviors
that engendered employee trust, rather than describing trustworthiness as a behavior itself, see Ellen M. Whitener, et al., Managers
as Initiators of Trust: An Exchange Relationship Framework for
Understanding Managerial Trustworthy Behavior, 23 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. (1998). We foresee difficulties with feedback to judges if trust
is considered a criterion. It may be one thing to say to a judge,
“Your behaviors, such as lack of eye contact, were perceived as not

grouped into six approximately equal-sized groups. Table 1
displays the six groups of 20 criteria, with brief descriptions of
each criterion.27
Content analysis. A content analysis describes the content of
narrative data, but goes beyond simple summarizing of information. The consultant developed a set of 29 “codes,” or categories, consisting of the 20 evaluative criteria (see Table 1) and
nine additional codes that provide greater detail for some of
the criteria (for example, the criterion courtroom tone & atmosphere was divided into two for purposes of coding: general
demeanor and courtroom tone). Each code has a definition to
facilitate consistent coding of observer comments.
The observers’ narratives are segmented into “codable units”
that reflect a single experience or reaction to a judicial behavior. These range from a single phrase for a straightforward
observation to one or more paragraphs describing in detail
something that occurred in court. Each codable unit is then
“coded,” i.e., associated with one or more codes, using the qualitative-analysis software program Atlas.ti. Observers are
encouraged to write in whatever manner best reflects their
experience of the judge’s behaviors, and codes are selected to
best describe the observers’ reactions to judicial behaviors,
rather than to interpret the fairness of the judge’s behavior in
any objective sense. In this way the evaluation assesses how
judicial behaviors are experienced by others.
Summary report. After coding all five observers’ narratives
for a judge, the coded units for each criterion are analyzed for
themes and commonalties, and then synthesized into one or
more short paragraphs that evoke as accurately as possible the
experience of reading all the narrative associated with each criterion.The paragraphs for all codes are then compiled into a
two- to three-page report. The report begins with an “executive
summary” that further synthesizes the information into three
standard categories: widely agreed-upon themes, minority observations,28 and anomalous comments. Table 2 displays the content and purpose of each of the three summary sections in
more detail.29
Uses of Courtroom-Observation Reports
The courtroom-observation program has three primary audiences: the general public, judges, and JPEC. Each stakeholder
group uses and benefits from the reports in different ways.

respectful, and respectful behaviors engender trust,” but quite
another to say, “Your behaviors were not trustworthy.”
28. Minority in this context refers to comments from two, or possibly
three, of the five observers, and does not refer to observers’ ethnic
or racial membership.
29. The courtroom-observation instrument initially collected a numerical rating of the judge on a five-point scale, similar to JPEC’s survey. Observers reported difficulty accurately assigning scores in
the context of writing contextual narratives. Commissioners felt
concern that the scoring did not meaningfully reflect the content
of the narrative data or qualitative synthesis, and the qualitativeresearch consultant felt concern that the act of completing the
numerical scores would have a priming effect on observers when
writing their narrative comments. Judges in the pilot study were
not averse to the removal of the scores. Consequently, JPEC
removed the scoring questions from the observation instrument.
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TABLE 1: TWENTY EVALUATIVE CRITERIA
CRITERIA

DESCRIPTION

GROUP 1: RESPECTFUL BEHAVIORS

LISTENING AND FOCUS

Here listening refers to indications of attention and engagement through active listening.

WELL PREPARED AND EFFICIENT

Here efficiency refers to the judge’s behaviors. The court’s efficiency appears below under “Courtroom tone & atmosphere.”

RESPECT FOR OTHER’S TIME

This includes the starting time of sessions as well as all interactions with those in court that take into consideration the
value of their time.

RESPECTFUL BEHAVIORS

This refers to specifically described behaviors directed at specific individuals or situations that indicate respect for a person’s value or status.

GROUP 2: RESPECTFUL TONE

COURTESY, POLITENESS, AND PATIENCE

This refers to descriptions of respectful behaviors more generally, not in the context of a specific individual or situation.

COURTROOM TONE AND ATMOSPHERE

This refers more generally to the tone of the court, and includes both the judge’s general demeanor over and above
specifically respectful behaviors, as well as the atmosphere of the courtroom.

BODY LANGUAGE

This refers to eye contact and facial expressions, general body language, and engaged behavior.

VOICE QUALITY

This refers to both mechanical qualities such as pitch and volume, and emotional qualities such as inexpressive, sarcastic,
or exasperated tone.

GROUP 3: NEUTRALITY

CONSISTENT AND EQUAL TREATMENT

This refers to listening to all sides and treating individuals in similar situations similarly.

ACTS WITH CONCERN FOR INDIVIDUAL NEEDS

This refers to concern for individual differences being taken account of in the judge’s actions.

EXPRESSES CONCERN FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

This refers to expressions of concern and due regard for the individual’s specific situation, over and above expressions of
respect that are included in “Respectful behaviors.”

UNHURRIED AND CAREFUL

This refers to allowing sufficient time for the judge and those in court to conduct themselves in a thorough manner.

GROUP 4: VOICE

CONSIDERED VOICE

This refers both to allowing those in court to express themselves and to the judge’s consideration of what was expressed in
his/her statements or decision.

FORMAL VOICE

This refers to giving voice based on required procedure without apparent consideration by the judge of what was
expressed.

GROUP 5: COMMUNICATION

COMMUNICATES CLEARLY

This refers both to clarity of speech and to the use of language appropriate to the listener.

ENSURES INFORMATION UNDERSTOOD

This refers to active attention by the judge in ensuring those in court understand all information relevant to them, and
includes translation and comprehension for non-native English speakers.

PROVIDES ADEQUATE EXPLANATIONS

This refers to providing sufficient explanation of the basis of decisions and of legal procedure and terminology to ensure
that those in court understand proceedings relevant to them.

GROUP 6: APPARENT FAIRNESS

VENEER OF FAIRNESS

This refers to behaviors intended to demonstrate fairness but backfire due to perceived insincerity.

INEFFECTIVE INGRATIATION

This refers to efforts to be liked, either defensively through apologies, self-deprecation, etc., or assertively through praise
or flattery, that backfire due to inappropriateness or perceived insincerity.

MANIPULATION

This refers to behaviors intended to produce feelings of fairness that backfire because the behaviors are perceived to be
manipulative.
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TABLE 2: OVERVIEW SECTIONS OF THE CONTENT-ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT

WIDELY AGREED-UPON THEMES

Behaviors reported by all (or almost all) observers and are thus well established. Deficits mentioned here were widely
reported and therefore merit attention.
The first statement in this section is an overall summary of the entire set of observer reports.
The subsequent statements are not intended to be a complete summary of the observers’ comments, but rather highlight
the most frequently noted and forcefully expressed themes in the way that the observers expressed them, with the goal of evoking an overall sense of the entire set of observer comments.
The final statement in this section indicates the number of observers indicating that they would feel comfortable appearing
before the judge.

MINORITY OBSERVATIONS

Behaviors noted by two (or possibly three) observers that would be worth building on (if desirable) or otherwise thinking
about avoiding.
Not every behavior reported by a minority of observers is summarized here, only those that reflect a notable or somewhat
discrepant perspective that was not widely agreed upon.

ANOMALOUS COMMENTS

Comments of one (or in rare cases two) observers that reflect a markedly different or contradictory perspective from all
other observers. They are intended to stimulate reflection, such as: why were these observers affected by this behavior; or, does
this particular situation tend to lead to this uncharacteristic behavior?
Not every anomalous comment is included in this overview section. While all are included in the main body of the report,
some are not included in this overview section because they are too minor or appear to reflect something anomalous about the
observer rather than the judge.

General public. Recent research suggests that voters in judicial elections are more interested in judges “as guarantors of
procedural fairness” than in assessing the individual policy
preferences, case outcomes, and partisanship of judges.30
JPEC’s courtroom-observation program addresses this public
concern by providing information to voters about each judge’s
performance with respect to procedural fairness.
The program also benefits the public in two other ways.
First, it provides certain members of the public—the courtroom observers themselves—an important voice in the evaluation process, as proxies for the many voters who never get to
court. Second, the program will help to increase procedural
fairness by providing feedback to judges about their behaviors. The courtroom-observation summary report provides
context-specific and rich information about how judicial
behaviors are perceived by observers in terms of procedural
fairness. JPEC anticipates that this detailed and candid feedback to judges will help judges make any needed behavioral
changes.
In summary, JPEC anticipates that through these three benefits to the public—providing voters with valued proceduralfairness information, providing a way for members of the public, as observers, to have a voice in JPE, and through improvements to procedural fairness through context-specific feedback
to judges—the courtroom-observation program will contribute
to increased levels of public trust and confidence in the court
system in Utah.
Judges. Judges benefit from the courtroom-observation program both at an individual level, through self-improvement, as
well at the level of the overall judiciary. One important goal of
the JPEC statute, as well as of the American Bar Association in

its JPE guidelines, is judicial self-improvement. The two evaluations completed during each six-year retention cycle31 are
similar in content but have different purposes. The midterm
JPE is intended to provide feedback for self-improvement,
while the end-of-term JPE is intended to provide JPEC with
information for its retention-election recommendation. The
way judges use their performance evaluations, however, is
more continuous. As most judges in Utah are retained, every
JPE, whether completed at midterm or end of term, contains
valuable self-improvement feedback.32
For any judge, obtaining specific feedback about courtroom
conduct is generally a challenge. Typically, everyone in a courtroom has something at stake or is otherwise involved in the
proceedings. Most people would demur if asked by the judge
for critical feedback. Courtroom observers are perhaps the
only people in court with the unique potential to provide
judges with candid and constructive feedback about their procedural-fairness behaviors.
Adopting procedural fairness as the basis for the courtroomobservation program has raised awareness about procedural
fairness in Utah’s judiciary. Using procedural fairness as a component of JPE has prompted judges to become more conscious
of their courtroom conduct. Indeed, the judiciary has already
begun including procedural fairness as a topic in its judicialeducation curriculum.
In summary, the procedural-fairness-based courtroomobservation program serves judges in two ways. First, it assists
with judicial self-improvement by providing judges with candid feedback based on actual behaviors observed. Second, it
has drawn attention to the importance of procedural fairness
both for individual judges and for the judiciary as a whole,

30. Jordan M. Singer, The Mind of The Judicial Voter, MICH. ST. L. REV.,
forthcoming, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1937742 (Oct. 3, 2011).
31. This is the cycle for judges other than justices of the Utah
Supreme Court and part-time justice-court judges. See n. 15 supra.

32. JPEC provides both the midterm and end-of-term courtroomobservation reports to judges using the same procedures and
reporting format.
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leading to an increased number of judicial training opportunities on procedural fairness.
JPEC. JPEC benefits from the courtroom-observation program because it provides an additional and different source of
data, thus enhancing the credibility of the evaluation for each
judge. In addition to the benefits JPEC receives, it also faces a
challenge in terms of how it will utilize the courtroom-observation data in the JPE.
With the addition of courtroom-observation data, JPEC’s
retention recommendation will be based both on contextually
rich and systematically analyzed qualitative data from the
courtroom observations, and on statistically valid quantitative
data from the surveys. Using these multiple types of data
increases the quality of the JPE for Utah judges.33
Through the courtroom-observation program, JPEC has
developed a way to systematically assess judicial behaviors in
terms of procedural fairness.34 Although JPEC was not statutorily required to evaluate judges on procedural-fairness criteria,
the growing body of research demonstrates its particular
importance to voters and court users. Indeed, after much
deliberation, JPEC decided that the relevance of procedural
fairness reached beyond courtroom observation to the full JPE.
JPEC therefore unanimously adopted an administrative rule
creating a minimum performance standard for procedural fairness. The new minimum performance standard states that the
judge’s performance must “demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence, based on courtroom observations and relevant
survey responses, that the judge’s conduct in court promotes
procedural fairness for court participants.”35
While JPEC has now promulgated a minimum performance
standard governing procedural fairness, it must still decide how
courtroom-observation results will be used in the JPE process.
JPEC will need to integrate the qualitative courtroom-observation data and the quantitative survey data to decide whether a
judge has met the minimum performance standard for procedural fairness. While the three statutory survey categories—
judicial temperament & integrity, legal ability, and administrative performance—do not explicitly include procedural fairness, the survey includes questions related to several aspects of
procedural fairness. Deciding whether a judge has met the minimum performance standard for procedural fairness will therefore be based on both courtroom observation and relevant survey information. JPEC will determine the relative weight to be
given to survey and courtroom-observation findings.
In summary, JPEC benefits from the courtroom-observation program by increasing the quality of the JPE through the
addition of qualitative data on procedural fairness. JPEC now
faces the challenge of integrating the courtroom-observation
results and the survey results to determine whether judges

33. See generally JANICE M. MORSE & LINDA NIEHAUS, MIXED METHOD
DESIGN: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES (2009).
34. Courtroom observation is undoubtedly daunting to many judges.
JPEC’s efforts to conduct its pilot study and to solicit feedback
from judges about the program’s design, including the use of a
professional research consultant and the structure and usefulness
of the summary report, helped to alleviate concerns about JPEC’s
use of courtroom observation in JPE.
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meet the minimum performance standard established for procedural justice.
FUTURE PLANS

Development of Courtroom-Observation Program
JPEC plans several developments for its courtroom-observation program, in part based on the experience of completing
courtroom observations for 72 judges. These plans include
updating the observer training program, efforts to increase the
diversity of observers, and extending the courtroom-observation program to part-time justice-court judges. Two other
potential uses of the program data are also described below.
Training program. Observers write their comments in very
different styles. Because the goal is to learn how observers
experience the judge’s procedural fairness behaviors, no constraints are put on the way in which the observers most comfortably express themselves. However, because the role of the
observer is intended as a proxy for courtroom participants,
JPEC trains observers to simply describe how they experience
the judge’s procedural fairness behaviors, not to interpret their
feelings or the judge’s behaviors in terms of their personal
knowledge of procedural fairness or other social-science principles. To assist ongoing training, the consultant periodically
provides examples to JPEC of ideal comments (containing
both a description of a judicial behavior and the observer’s
experience or reaction to the behavior), comments that could
be improved (those that are codable but that are insufficiently
elaborated to be included in the synthesis), and uninterpretable comments (those that cannot be coded as written).
Diversity of observers. Volunteers for courtroom observation
are not necessarily representative of courtroom participants.
The current cadre of observers are predominantly Caucasian,
middle-aged or older, middle class, retired, and well educated.
Because research suggests that the core principles of procedural fairness are universal, an unrepresentative cadre of volunteers may not adversely affect the validity of the observations. While research has shown that certain personalities are
more sensitive to procedural fairness than others,36 it is not
known whether in fact an unrepresentative cadre of volunteers
does experience certain judicial behaviors in the same way as
courtroom participants. If the efforts of JPEC to recruit a more
diverse cadre of volunteers are successful, then further
research on the accumulating body of content analyses may
shed light on this issue.
A second issue concerns the gender of judges and observers.
Research has shown that female judges score consistently and
significantly lower than their male counterparts in JPE surveys.37 For example, female judges are systematically evaluated
as weak and indecisive when observers perceive that they fail

35. Utah Admin. Code R597-3-4. The standard became effective on
November 23, 2011, and first affects Utah judges facing retention
election in 2014.
36. Manfred Schmitt & Martin Dörfel, Procedural Injustice at Work,
Justice Sensitivity, Job Satisfaction and Psychosomatic Well-Being 29
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. (1999).
37. Wood, et al., supra n. 9.

to assert control, but as unduly punitive when they assert
authority. In one study, male judges were found to have a lower
baseline expectation for courtesy, and so were judged as more
courteous than female judges. Other research has shown that
ingratiation between males and females is viewed with suspicion.38 Where ingratiation is sincere and nonmanipulative,
such as appropriate apology or praise, this does not threaten
procedural fairness, but if a judge and the recipient of ingratiation are of different genders, this may have negative procedural-fairness effects. JPEC attempts to minimize potential
gender effects by allocating both male and female observers to
each courtroom wherever feasible.39
Justice-court judge JPEs. Although full-time justice-court
judges are currently evaluated in the same way as all other
non-appellate judges in Utah, JPEC has found that these evaluations cannot be used with part-time justice-court judges.
Part-time justice courts, with their low volume of cases, rural
locations, part-time hours, high levels of self-represented litigants, and few court staff, make valid surveys results impossible to obtain. Courtroom observation will, however, remain a
critical component of the justice court JPE, both because it is
not dependent on large sample sizes and because of its particular value to part-time justice-court judges. Most litigants in
justice courts do not have an attorney to represent them.
Consequently, the direct interactions between judges and litigants are an especially important feature of a justice-court
experience. The detailed procedural-fairness feedback contained in the courtroom-observation summary report could be
some of the most valuable self-improvement information the
JPE can provide to a justice-court judge.
Research on Accumulating Content Analyses of Courtroom
Observations
As the number of content analyses that have been made
increases, JPEC may decide to compare various groups of content analyses (e.g., by type of court, rural or urban location,
years of experience, and gender of judge, etc.), and to explore
themes, trends, and other patterns and commonalties within
and among the various groups. This may include comparing
and contrasting the quantitative survey scores for each judge
with the qualitative content analyses of observation data, both
to validate the evaluation process and to gain further understanding of judicial performance and evaluation.

CONCLUSION

Utah’s JPEC has taken advantage of the discretion afforded by
the Utah Legislature to make administrative rules regarding the
mandated courtroom-observation component of the Utah JPE
program. Specifically, JPEC has focused courtroom observations
on the procedural-fairness aspects of judicial behavior; established a minimum performance standard for procedural fairness;
used qualitative methods to capture the rich, context-specific
information available in the observers’ narratives; and retained a
consultant experienced in qualitative-evaluation research to systematically analyze and produce syntheses of the narrative data.
JPEC hopes that its work will provide voters in retention elections with valued procedural-fairness information; provide
members of the public, as volunteer observers, with a voice in
JPE; provide judges with candid feedback on procedural-fairness
behaviors for self-improvement; draw attention to issues of procedural fairness in the judiciary as a whole; and provide JPEC
with a wider range of information for making retention recommendations. JPEC plans to continue its efforts to improve the
courtroom-observation program, and looks forward to dialogue
with other states about this important aspect of JPE.
Nicholas H. Woolf is the qualitative-research
consultant to the Utah Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission; in 2011, he completed
content analyses of courtroom-observation data
for 72 Utah judges. Woolf has a Ph.D. in education from the University of Iowa and has
served as qualitative research and evaluation
consultant to numerous national and international projects in a variety of fields. He is a Visiting Academic
Fellow at Henley Business School, part of the University of
Reading in the United Kingdom. As an independent educator and
trainer, he has conducted more than 280 workshops in qualitativedata analysis using the ATLAS.ti software program. More information about his work is available at www.learnatlas.com, and he
may be contacted at woolf@pobox.com.

Development of Procedural Fairness Based Judicial Training
The accumulating findings of the courtroom-observation
program could be used to develop more judicial training about
procedural fairness. The detailed descriptions of observed
courtroom situations coupled with the observers’ accounts of
how they experienced those situations could be used in judicial
education. Further, the systematic collection of courtroom
practices that link specific judicial behaviors with proceduralfairness reactions may help to build a body of evidence about
procedural fairness that judges find persuasive and compelling.

Jennifer MJ Yim, MPA, is the vice-chairperson
of the Utah Judicial Performance Evaluation
Commission. She is the past chairperson of
JPEC’s Courtroom Observation Subcommittee
and a past member of its Rules Subcommittee.
Her work in the justice system has included
service on Utah’s Third Judicial District
Nominating Commission (2003-2007), Utah’s
Youth Parole Authority (2001-2011), and as the director of the
Utah Judicial Council’s Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Fairness
in the Legal System (1997-2001). She is currently an appointed
member of the Magistrate Merit Selection Panel for the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, a procedural-justice
consultant to the Utah Division of Juvenile Justice Services, and a
doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Utah.

38. Robert C. Liden & Terence R. Mitchell, Ingratiatory Behavior in
Organizational Settings, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 572 (1988).

39. Research has reported similar effects for African-American judges.
No African-American judges are in the current cycle of Utah JPEs.
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Is Procedural Fairness
Applicable to All Courts?
Victor E. Flango

I

n a white paper of the American Judges Association published in this journal, Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Leben
present a powerful case for using the principles of procedural fairness:
Judges must be aware of the dissonance that exists
between how they view the legal process and how the
public before them views it. While judges should definitely continue to pay attention to creating fair outcomes, they should also tailor their actions, language,
and responses to the public’s expectations of procedural
fairness. By doing so, these judges will establish themselves as legitimate authorities; substantial research suggests that increased compliance with court orders and
decreased recidivism by criminal offenders will result.
Procedural fairness also will lessen the difference in how
minority populations perceive and react to the courts.1

They further summarized Professor Tom Tyler’s expectations of procedural fairness as:
• Voice: The ability to participate in the case by expressing
their viewpoint;
• Neutrality: consistently applied legal principles, unbiased
decision makers, and a “transparency” about how decisions
are made;
• Respectful treatment: individuals are treated with dignity
and their rights are obviously protected; and
• Trustworthy authorities: authorities are benevolent, caring,
and sincerely trying to help the litigants—this trust is garnered by listening to individuals and by explaining or justifying decisions that address the litigants’ needs. 2
These are laudable expectations. If they can help operationally define the desirable characteristics of judges in a way
that the more ambiguous and abstract concepts, such as “judicial temperament,” do not, they could help sitting judges
improve and could also help guide the public (in elective
states) and governors and legislators (in appointive states)
select new judges.

Footnotes
1. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient
in Public Satisfaction (A White Paper of the American Judges
Association), 44 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2007-08).
2. Id. at 6. Some other sources use “respect” for “respectful treatment,” “participation” for “voice,” and “trust” or “trustworthiness” for “trustworthy authorities.” See generally, David B
Rottman, Adhere to Procedural Fairness in the Justice System 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POL’Y 835 (2007); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 30-31 (2007-08).
3. Gary Hickinbottom, What Makes a Good Judge?, in JUDICIAL
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Many judges and academics have provided lists of the qualities a good judge should have. These usually include professional competence (legal abilities and intellect), integrity, and
judicial temperament (neutral, decisive, respectful, and composed). For example, in his essay, “What Makes a Good
Judge?,” Sir Gary Hickinbottom divides the attributes of a
good judge into professional, personal, and administrative
components.3 Professional attributes include knowledge of
the law, legal analytic skills, “good judgment,” and intellectual
concentration, whereas personal attributes include such qualities as integrity, objectivity, and temperament.
Do the four basic “expectations” of procedural fairness
cover these desirable qualities of a judge? My contention here
is that the role of courts has evolved over time and that the
role of judges has adapted to match the changing role of
courts. Thomas Henderson and his colleagues have clearly
distinguished three adjudication processes—procedural, decisional, and diagnostic—and have noted that all three, along
with variations on each, are used by contemporary courts in
varying combinations.4 Thomas Clarke and I have gone a
step further and suggested that court structures be modified
to be more congruent with adjudication processes.5 In any
event, the contention here is that different adjudication
processes require different judicial attributes and skills, and
that procedural fairness was developed with the image of the
traditional trial court in mind. So I ask: Are procedural-fairness concepts equally effective and applicable to judges serving in courts that do not fit the traditional image of trial
courts?
PROCEDURAL ADJUDICATION AND
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

The classic image of judge as neutral arbiter has its roots in
the adversary system. The very conception of courts, and
therefore the expectations we have of them, is derived from the
adversary process. The image of a court is that of a judge in a
trial setting. Even though trials are “vanishing”, i.e., becoming
a smaller and smaller portion of the way cases are resolved, tri-

APPOINTMENTS: BALANCING INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND
LEGITIMACY 55-66 (2010), available at http://www2.american
bar.org/calendar/young-lawyers-division-spring-conference2011/Documents/independentjudiciaryprogrammaterials.pdf (last
visited June 1, 2012).
4. THOMAS A. HENDERSON, CORNELIUS KERWIN & HILDY SAIZOW,
STRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF COURT UNIFICATION
REFORM (1984).
5. Victor E. Flango & Thomas Clarke, Which Disputes Belong in
Court? 50 JUDGE’S J. 22 (2011).

als provide the drama of courts and are the images that are televised and covered in the news.6
The adversary process assumes that there are two sides to
the case—perhaps rooted in the medieval process of trial by
combat.7 The core of the adversary system is the form of participation accorded to the parties. Lon Fuller defines these as
the “institutionally protected opportunity to present proofs
and arguments for a decision in his favor.”8 Each side has the
opportunity to present arguments in his or her favor. Logically,
the requirement for the participant to be able to provide proofs
and arguments requires a neutral arbiter before whom to present the arguments and a set of standards or laws so that the
litigants know the basis upon which the decision will be made.
Accordingly, the role of the judge in the adversary process is
to preside over the proceedings and maintain order.
Henderson and his colleagues called this process procedural
adjudication. During a trial, the judge rules on whether any of
the evidence the parties want to use is illegal or improper. If
the trial is before a jury, the judge gives instructions about the
law that applies to the case; if the trial is before the court, the
judge determines the facts and decides the case. After the trial
(bench or jury), the judge may decide on damages or mete out
the sentence to the convicted. Note also the role of the judge
in this idealized conception—a very passive umpire enforcing
the procedural rules of the game. In the language of one recent
confirmation hearing, the judge’s role is a passive referee who
just “calls balls and strikes.”9
Procedural fairness comports well with the adversary
process. Voice is the most important component of procedural
fairness, not only because it is important for litigants to have
their say in court but also because it shapes the other components—neutrality, trust, and respect.10 The structure of the
adversary process provides ample opportunity for voice
because time is allotted for each side to tell their side of the
story before a decision is made. A trial in particular is a place
“where a citizen can effectively tell his own story publically in
a forum of power.”11 Moreover, the expectation of neutrality
—honest and impartial decision makers who base decisions on
consistent application of law to facts—is built into the role of
the judge in the adversary process as is the expectation that

defendants will be treated with
dignity and respect.

Procedural fairness is also
compatible with the problemsolving process. The idea of providing voice to litigants in a nonadversarial setting was one of the
reasons this cooperative approach to dispute resolution was
created. Particularly in family law, once a fertile source of trials, there have been calls to abandon adversarial proceedings
“in favor of more informal approaches with the goal of encouraging parents to develop positive post-divorce co-parenting
relationships.”12
More recent “problem-solving” courts13 originated from the
efforts of “practical, creative, and intuitive judges and court
personnel, grappling to find an alternative to revolving door
justice, especially as dispensed to drug-addicted defendants.”14
From the opening of the first drug court in Dade County,
Florida, in 1989,15 drug courts spread rapidly based upon
anecdotal reports of success in reducing recidivism, as well as
the infusion of federal dollars. By the end of 2009, there were
2,459 drug courts and an additional 1,189 problem-solving
courts in the United States, including courts for DWI, mental
health, domestic violence, truancy, child support, homeless,
prostitution, reentry, and gambling.16
Problem-solving courts require judges to be more active,
less formal, and more personally engaged with each offender.
One New York Times article summarized:
The judges often have an unusual amount of information about the people who appear before them. These
people, who are often called clients, rather than defendants, can talk directly to the judges, rather than communicating through lawyers. And the judges monitor
these defendants for months, even years, using a system
of rewards and punishments, which can include jail
time. Judges also receive training in their court’s specialty and may have a psychologist on the staff.17

6. See the special issue of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (Nov.
2004) devoted to the issue of “vanishing” trials.
7. ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL 21 (1977).
8. Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1960).
9. It is interesting to note how this perception of judging permeates
the traditional conception of what a judge is. Even John Roberts
at his confirmation hearing to be Chief Justice of the United States
noted that the judge, in this case an appellate judge, is merely an
umpire, calling balls and strikes. Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
10. See Tyler, supra note 2, at 30.
11. Paul Butler, The Case for Trials: Considering the Intangibles, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 634 (2004).
12. Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law,
78 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 895 (2010).

13. The conventional term “problem-solving courts” has passed into
the language even though most are not separate courts but separate dockets or calendars of larger courts or divisions. In most
instances, they involve a single judge handling a single type of
case on a periodic schedule.
14. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: It’s Not Just for
Problem-Solving Courts and Calendars Anymore, in FUTURE TRENDS
IN STATE COURTS 2004 (C. Flango, N. Kauder, K. Pankey, and C.
Campbell eds.), and citing BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER,
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE COURTS 6 (2003).
15. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief
Primer, LAW AND POL’Y 23 (2001).
16. C. WEST HUDDLESTON III AND DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, PAINTING THE
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND
OTHER PROBLEM SOLVING PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011).
17. Leslie Eaton & Leslie Kaufman, In Problem-Solving Court, Judges
Turn Therapist, N.Y.TIMES, April 26, 2005.

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS

Procedural
fairness
comports well
with the
adversary
process.
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This personal involvement
creates a tension with the neutral arbiter role of the judge and
sometimes leads to the characterization of problem-solving
judges as “social workers” or
“therapists.”18 Problem-solving
judges are not neutral—they
hope that treatment succeeds.
They praise and sanction defendants, rather than remain aloof,
but this active engagement
could create the perception that
they are not impartial. Some
may also consider collaboration
in “staffings,” where the judge
and treatment team meet in
advance of hearings to discuss
the offender’s progress in treatment and to reach consensus
about rewards and sanctions, to be in conflict with the neutral
arbiter judicial role.
Problem-solving courts would seem to be the ideal setting
for procedural fairness, especially voice, but stumbles on the
concept of neutrality because a judge cannot both give the
impression of neutrality and be a cheerleader for the success of
treatment.
There is a way out of this dilemma, however—bifurcate
cases into adjudication and sentencing phases—”emphasize
traditional due process protections during the adjudication
phase of a case and the achievement of tangible, constructive
outcomes post-adjudication.”19 Especially in criminal cases
with a substance-abuse component, such as DWI cases, the full
adversary process with all of its due process protections could
be employed until guilt has been established. After guilt is
established, problem-solving principles designed to prevent
repeat offenses could be used to select the best sentencing
options, whether they be therapeutic or punitive. If problemsolving processes were used primarily after adjudication, procedural-fairness principles could be put into play for treatment.

The use of
procedural
fairness principles
for dispositionoriented
resolution of
cases is more
problematic
because of
the focus on
expeditious
decision making.

DISPOSITIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

The use of procedural fairness principles for dispositionoriented resolution of cases is more problematic because of the
focus on expeditious decision making. Although a small proportion of “important” cases are resolved by trial (only about
2% in 2008), trials have never been the way most cases, even

18. Id. (“Now, in drug treatment courts, judges are cheerleaders and
social workers as much as jurists.”).
19. J. Feinblatt, Gregg Berman & D. Denckla, Judicial Innovation at the
Crossroads: The Future of Problem Solving Courts, 15(3) CT.
MANAGER 28-34 (2000).
20. Even that 70% is an underestimate because ten states plus the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are unified and thus do not
distinguish courts of general jurisdiction from courts of limited
jurisdiction, but often use a different category of judge, such as an
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felonies, were resolved. The justice system would simply break
down if most cases went to trial. Instead, most criminal cases
are resolved by plea agreements, and have been since the 19th
century. Civil cases are settled, and traffic cases and ordinance
violations are resolved by the payment of a fine. About 80% of
criminal cases are misdemeanors and most (more than 70%)
are handled in courts of limited jurisdiction by municipal
judges, justices of the peace, or magistrates.20 In the sense that
these lower criminal courts hear the bulk of criminal cases,
including disorderly conduct, drunkenness, prostitution, petty
theft, and simple assault cases, they are the courts with the
most contact with offenders, and it is in these courts that the
stereotype of “assembly line” justice was created. 21 One
Albany lawyer described the situation in the lower courts of
New York:
The biggest problem with our court system is the volume of cases. The volume is so large that the courts have
to rely on assembly line justice. It really is an assembly
line. The police officer prepares the initial papers and
files them with the clerk. The clerk gives the papers to
the prosecutor who reviews them and discusses the case
with the lawyer or the pro-se defendant. The papers then
go back to the clerk, who then hands them to the judge.
The judge calls the case. There’s a brief discussion at the
bench. Then the papers go back to the clerk, who then
processes the result (fine notice, schedule next date,
etc.). Think about this: If a court has 100 cases on for a
particular session (a typical number for courts like
Colonie, Guilderland, Albany, etc), and each case takes
15 minutes, that would take 25 hours. That’s not going
to work. If each case takes only 5 minutes, it still takes 8
hours, so that’s still not going to work. Most courts end
up at about 1-2 minutes per case. That’s assembly line
justice.22
These types of cases require facts to be established so that
the law can be quickly applied; sentences and financial penalties are limited so that dispositions can be expeditious.23
Clearing the docket then becomes very important, and the task
becomes processing large numbers of individual cases, a more
bureaucratic process not unfamiliar to the executive branch of
government. Judges must decide large numbers of lowerstakes cases every day, rather than spend days or weeks making a decision in one case at trial, and so the procedures must
be streamlined. Consequently, judges may take a more active
role in all phases of case processing to ensure that the attorneys, many of whom may be court appointed, are devoting the
proper attention to their clients. The point here is with that

associate judge, to handle these cases.
21. See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
22. Warren Redlich, Assembly Line Justice, at ALBANY LAWYER (blog),
http://albany-lawyer.blogspot.com/2007/04/assembly-linejustice.html (last visited June 1, 2012).
23. See Henderson, Kerwin & Saizow, supra note 4, at 11 (summarizing “decisional adjudication”).

many cases to dispose of in such a short time, can lower court
judges really be expected to provide litigants with meaningful
voice—the ability to participate in a case by expressing their
viewpoint—and still keep ahead of their dockets? Is there time
to express their caring, to explain and to justify their decisions? In sum, is procedural fairness possible in high-volume
lower courts?
With respect to judges, I think the answer is “no,” but there
is no reason why the principles of procedural fairness would
not apply to other court employees. A study conducted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts in California found that
experience with traffic and other low-stakes courts were a particular source of litigant dissatisfaction.24 Because judges have
such short interactions with litigants in these high-volume
courts, the way litigants are treated by court staff becomes
more important.
In summation, the principles of procedural fairness were
created for an adversarial process and work well there. They
can be adapted for the problem-solving process that happens

after adjudication, but they can only be employed in the vast
numbers of ordinary, run-of-the-mill cases by court staff, not
by judges.
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24. DAVID B. ROTTMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS (Administrative Office of the Courts, Calif. 2005).
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Addressing Nonsystematic
Factors Contributing to the
Underrepresentation of
Minorities as Jurors
Elizabeth Neeley

T

he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right of criminal defendants to “a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” An “impartial jury” requires the jury be selected from a representative
cross-section of the community. But how is a fair cross-section
determined? In Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court outlined
a three-pronged test defendants must satisfy to establish a
prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of
the group in the jury-selection process.1

In her article, “Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations:
Why the Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross
Section Claims Must be Expanded,” Paula Hannaford-Agor
explains:
[w]ith few exceptions, the cases that have survived
the hurdle of Duren’s [first and] second prong[s] ultimately fail because the underrepresentation was not the
result of “systematic exclusion.” Courts have consistently held the Constitution cannot hold trial courts
accountable for protecting the rights of defendants if
they lack the ability to prevent or control the factors that
undermine or interfere with those rights.2
For example, caselaw has established that when source lists
used to compile master jury lists (especially voter-registration
lists) significantly underrepresent minorities, it is not systematic exclusion for two reasons. First, unless those lists were
created in a manner that constitutionally discriminates against

This article is based on one previously published in The Nebraska
Lawyer: Elizabeth Neeley, Representative Juries: Examining the Initial
and Eligible Pools of Jurors, July/Aug. 2011 NEB. LAW. 5.]
Footnotes
1. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
2. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations:
Why the Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section
Claims Must be Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 763-64 (2011).
3. Id. at 764.
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minorities they presumptively pass constitutional muster.
Second, because courts have no authority to require underrepresented groups to register to vote or obtain a state driver’s
license, their underrepresentation is not inherent to the juryselection process, but rather is a result of self-exclusion.
Hannaford-Agor argues:
By perpetuating the misconception that courts have
no responsibility to address causes of underrepresentation other than those inherent in the system itself,
caselaw has created a functional safe harbor in which
courts can ignore substantial minority underrepresentation in their own jury pools as long as they can plausibly
deny actively contributing to the problem.3
Hannaford-Agor argues that despite this lack of incentive
created by caselaw, there are in fact many practices that courts
can employ to address or mitigate the impact of nonsystematic
factors. This article discusses one state’s work to both measure
and address the extent to which nonsystematic factors have
contributed to the underrepresentation of racial and ethnic
minorities in the initial and eligible pools of jurors.
REFORM OF NEBRASKA’S JURY-COMPILATION PROCESS

In 2001, the Nebraska Supreme Court and the Nebraska
State Bar Association established a joint task force to examine
issues of racial and ethnic bias in the court system and legal
profession.4 The 18-month investigation was released in 2003
and examined a broad range of topics.5 The primary recommendation of the report was to establish a standing committee
to implement the recommendations of the report and to continually work to promote diversity in the judicial workforce
and legal profession, ensure equal access to the justice system,
and address racial disparities in the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Over the past nine years, a priority for the
Nebraska Minority Justice Committee has been to examine

4. For information on state commissions and task forces charged with
examining issues of racial and ethnic fairness in the courts visit the
website for the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness
in the Courts at: http://www.consortiumonline.net/
5. THE NEBRASKA MINORITY JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT FINAL REPORT
(2003), available online at: http://ppc.nebraska.edu/userfiles/file/
Documents/projects/MinorityandJusticeTaskForce/mjtf_final_rep
ort.pdf.

and improve the extent to which Nebraska’s juries are representative of the communities that they serve.
REQUIRING PERIODIC JURY REFRESHMENT

During their study, the Task Force discovered that there was
no statutory requirement for how often counties should update
their jury-pool lists. Some counties, therefore, had not updated
their jury-pool lists for several years (in some instances more
than 15 years). Given the state’s quickly changing demographics, this practice resulted in jury pools that were not representative of the communities that they served (excluding several
groups of people including young adults, recent residents of
Nebraska, and newly naturalized citizens).
To remedy this, LB 19 was passed in 2003, requiring all
counties within Nebraska to refresh their jury-pool lists annually.6 The goal of LB 19 was to make jury pools across the state
more representative of their communities. In 2005, the
Nebraska Appleseed Center on Law in the Public Interest,
together with the Minority Justice Committee, conducted a
small-scale study to examine the impact that these bills had on
the diversity of Nebraska’s jury pools. Because baseline data
were not available, perceptional data measuring the impact of
the legislation were gathered through phone interviews with
district court clerks. Prior to the law change, only 44 of
Nebraska’s 93 counties updated their master list on an annual
or biannual basis. Researchers concluded that more than 25%
of counties interviewed reported noticing either great or some
change in the composition of the jury pool following annual
updates, suggesting that the bill had its intended effect in a
number of counties. Although not an intended impact of the
legislation, annual or biannual updates also improved the efficiency of the jury-compilation process by updating resident
addresses and removing individuals who have moved from the
county (and are therefore ineligible) as well as county residents who are deceased.
EXAMINING THE JURY COMPILATION PROCESS:
ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL MODEL

While the Committee counted its experience with jury
refreshment as an early success, it was still inhibited from fully
examining the extent to which juries are representative of their
community because of a lack of data on the racial and ethnic
composition of potential jurors, an issue affecting most jurisdictions. In Nebraska at this time, each county utilized its own
distinctive juror-qualification form, and only a handful of
Nebraska’s 93 counties collected data on race and ethnicity.
Because existing data were not available, Nebraska established
its own process to allow it to examine and monitor the jurycompilation process.

6. Because many of Nebraska’s smaller counties may not even hold a
jury trial over the course of a year, LB 712 was passed in 2010 to
require counties with populations under 3,000 to refresh every
five years, counties with populations between 3,000 and 7,000 to
refresh every two years, and counties with populations over 7,000
to refresh annually.
7. Nebraska Supreme Court Rules Regarding the Use of Nebraska
Juror Qualification Form (adopted December 14, 2005, effective

In 2005 the Committee worked to pass LB 105, which
authorized the Nebraska Supreme Court to adopt a uniform
juror-qualification form and provided the Nebraska Supreme
Court, or its designee, access to juror-qualification forms for
the purpose of research. Accordingly, the Nebraska Minority
Justice Committee worked on developing a uniform document
that would continue to meet the needs of each county but
would also allow for a confidential method of collecting demographic data. The Committee reviewed dozens of counties’
juror-qualification forms, consulted Nebraska statutes regarding juror qualifications, and worked with a group of district
court clerks and jury commissioners in developing the uniform juror-qualification form. The form was subsequently
approved and adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court and is
currently being implemented in each county.7
In addition to the information required by statute and information added at the request of the district court clerks for
practical administrative purposes, the qualification form collects data on the race and ethnicity of the potential juror. This
information is collected on a page separate from the body of
the juror-qualification form. The page containing the “confidential juror information” is removed from the qualification
form, stored by the clerks until the end of the jury term, and
then mailed to the Committee via the Nebraska Administrative
Office of the Courts, along with lists of those ultimately
selected for voir dire and those who served on the impaneled
juries. The information gleaned from the uniform juror qualification form allows researchers to examine each stage of the
jury-compilation process, from the compilation of the initial
pool to the final impaneled jury, to determine whether and
why the composition of the jury pools may or may not be
reflective of the diversity of Nebraska’s counties. To our knowledge, Nebraska is the first state to institutionalize a system to
allow the continual monitoring of jury demographics throughout the compilation process.
EXPANDING JUROR SOURCE LISTS

State law had provided that master jury lists were comprised
by combining the lists of registered voters and registered drivers in the state of Nebraska. There had been anecdotal concerns that because minorities may be less likely to be registered
to vote or to drive, the source lists may not effectively achieve
a representative master list. In December of 2008, the
Committee released a study that confirmed these perceptions.
Based on an examination of nearly 70,000 juror-qualification
forms from eight of Nebraska’s most diverse counties, data
indicated that racial and ethnic minorities were significantly
underrepresented in the initial and eligible pools of jurors.8
Addressing disparity in these initial stages is important

January 1, 2006), available online at: http://court.nol.org/ rules/
amendments/Ch6Art10AppAAmds.pdf.
8. ELIZABETH NEELEY, REPRESENTATIVE JURIES: EXAMINING THE INITIAL
AND ELIGIBLE POOLS OF JURORS (2008) (Nebraska Minority Justice
Committee), available at: http://ppc.nebraska.edu/userfiles/file/
Documents/projects/MinorityJusticeCommittee/Reports/Represen
tative_Juries_Policy_Report_2008.pdf.
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TABLE 1: 2008 RACIAL COMPOSITION OF DRIVER’S-LICENSE HOLDERS AND STATE-ID-CARD HOLDERS
RACE
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Am. Indian
Other
Unknown
White
Total

DRIVER’S LICENSE

PERCENTAGE

ID CARD

PERCENTAGE

23,768
47,626
3,068
7,569
50,354
3
1,152,354
1,284,742

1.85%
3.71%
0.24%
0.59%
3.92%
0.00%
89.70%
100%

3,284
13,672
1,149
2,352
13,191
2
43,461
77,111

4.26%
17.73%
1.49%
3.05%
17.11%
0.00%
56.36%
100%

because representative jury panels are necessarily dependent
on the extent to which the initial and eligible juror pools are
representative of the community.
The Committee explored several potential reforms to the
compilation process and concluded that the most viable solution was to expand the source lists used to compile the master
jury lists. The Committee explored the possibility of adding
the following registries: state identification cards, tax rolls,
unemployment, and those receiving state aid through the
Department of Health and Human Services. In determining
which, if any, of these lists would be appropriate, the
Committee considered numerous factors including: whether
the addition of the list would reduce the significant racial and
ethnic differences documented in the initial jury pools; the
costs involved in obtaining the list; the willingness of various
agencies to provide the necessary data; the qualifications for
being included on the potential list; and the level of duplication with the current source lists. Ultimately, the Committee
recommended that through legislative action, the source lists
used to create the master jury list should be expanded to
include individuals with state identification cards.
State identification cards are issued through the Nebraska
Department of Motor Vehicles.9 As of October 2008, the total
number of individuals with state identification cards (but not
drivers’ licenses) was 77,111. To obtain a state identification
card, Nebraska law indicates that applicants need only provide
“proof of date of birth and identity with documents containing
a photograph or with nonphoto identity documents which
include his or her full legal name and date of birth.”10
The Department of Motor Vehicles provided a county
breakdown by race and ethnicity of individuals over the age of
18 with state identification cards. The table above indicates
that nonwhites (Asians, Blacks, Hispanics,11 and American
Indians) comprise a much greater percentage of state-identification-card holders than of registered drivers.
Based on data indicating the significant underrepresentation
of certain minority groups, and the above statistics regarding
state identification cards, a bill was drafted adding state-identification-card holders as a source list for compiling juries. On
May 29, 2009, the Governor signed the bill, LB 35, into law.

Since the law change, the Committee has measured the
extent to which this legislative change has resulted in juries
that are more representative of the communities that they
serve. Relying on the methods used in its original examination,12 the analysis compares the demographics of the county
population to the demographics of the initial and eligible pools
of jurors. The county population is based on U.S. Census data,
which excludes individuals under the age of 19 and noncitizens (who are ineligible for jury service). The initial pool of
jurors includes individuals who have received and returned a
juror-qualification form. The eligible pool of jurors includes
those who remain in the pool after individuals are removed for
statutory eligibility criteria or disqualification, and those who
opt out for jury service.
Chi-square analyses were conducted to determine whether
the county’s demographics were significantly different from the
demographics of the county’s initial jury pools and eligible
pools. A chi-square test takes an expected proportion (in this
case, the proportion of each racial and ethnic group) and compares it to an observed proportion (in this case, the observed
racial and ethnic proportions in the initial and eligible pools).
The chi-square test indicates whether the difference between
the groups is statistically significant. A standardized residual
over 2.0 indicates that the disparity contributes to the significant chi-square value; the greater the standardized residual, the
greater the disparity.
Given the space limitations of this article, the results discussed below are limited to Douglas County (Omaha),
Nebraska’s largest county. Prior to the law change, Whites and
Asians were significantly overrepresented in the initial pools of
jurors while Blacks and Hispanics were significantly underrepresented in the initial pools of jurors (see Table 2). Following
the law change, Blacks are no longer significantly underrepresented in the initial pool (the standardized residual indicating
significant disparity dropped from 16.1 to 1.8), and Whites are
no longer significantly overrepresented in the initial pool (the
standardized residual dropped from 5.8 to 1.1). While significant disparities still remain for Asians and Hispanics, the
extent of the disparity, as measured by the standardized resid-

9. Neb. Rev. St. § 60-4,181.
10. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-484 (f)(i).
11. Please note that the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles only
began collecting information on Hispanics in 2008. For this rea-

son, the number of Hispanics is drastically lower than expected. It
is likely that a large percentage of Hispanic drivers were captured
in the “other” category prior to the policy change.
12. See NEELEY, supra note 8.
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TABLE 2: DOUGLAS COUNTY INITIAL AND ELIGIBLE POOLS OF JURORS PRE- AND POST-LAW CHANGE

COMPARISON TO THE INITIAL POOL
WHITE

BLACK

ASIAN

AMERICAN
INDIAN

HISPANIC

COUNTY POP

83.7%

10.4%

1.5%

0.6%

3.9%

INITIAL POOL (PRE-LAW CHANGE)

86.8%

7.4%

2.3%

0.6%

3.0%

INITIAL POOL (POST-LAW CHANGE)

84.8%

9.8%

2.0%

0.6%

2.9%

LEVEL OF DISPARITY (PRE-LAW CHANGE) (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL)

5.8

16.1

11.3

0.5

8.0

LEVEL OF DISPARITY (POST-LAW CHANGE) (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL)

1.1

1.8

3.8

0.5

4.6

COUNTY POP

83.7%

10.4%

1.5%

0.6%

3.9%

ELIGIBLE POOL (PRE-LAW CHANGE)

87.1%

7.7%

1.9%

0.6%

2.7%

ELIGIBLE POOL (POST-LAW CHANGE)

86.1%

10.1%

1.5%

0.5%

1.7%

LEVEL OF DISPARITY (PRE-LAW CHANGE) (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL)

4.4

9.7

3.4

0.6

7.2

LEVEL OF DISPARITY (POST-LAW CHANGE) (STANDARDIZED RESIDUAL)

2.0

0.7

0.1

0.7

8.2

COMPARISON TO THE ELIGIBLE POOL

ual, has greatly decreased (from 11.3 to 3.8 for Asians and from
8.0 to 4.6 for Hispanics).
In regards to the eligible pool of jurors, prior to the law
change, Whites and Asians were significantly overrepresented
in the eligible pools of jurors while Blacks and Hispanics were
significantly underrepresented in the eligible pools of jurors.
Following the law change, Blacks are no longer significantly
underrepresented in the eligible pool (the standardized residual dropped from 9.7 to 0.7) and Whites and Asians are no
longer significantly overrepresented in the eligible pool (the
standardized residual dropped from 4.4 to 2.0 for Whites and
from 3.4 to 0.1 for Asians). However, significant disparities
still remain for the Hispanic population.
The other counties examined exhibited similar trends; the
addition of state-identification-card holders has significantly
improved the representation of Blacks and, in certain populations, American Indians in Nebraska’s initial and eligible juror
pools. The addition of state-identification-card holders has
also improved the representation of Hispanics in the initial
pool of jurors, but has not improved representation in the eligible pools. To further examine this finding, the Committee
conducted an analysis of eligibility criteria by race.
Jurors from the initial pool can become ineligible for three
reasons:13 (1) They do not meet the juror requirements (not a
U.S. citizen; not a county resident; do not read, speak, or understand English; not over 18 years of age); (2) they are disqualified (they are a sheriff, jailer, deputy, clerk, or judge; they are a
party to a pending case; or they have a criminal offense which

disqualifies them); or (3) they opt out (over 65 years of age,
nursing mother, active military, or recent prior jury service).
Ineligibility rates differ by race and ethnicity (see Table 3).
Blacks (31.6%) and American Indians (32.8%) have comparable rates of ineligibility to Whites (31.1%), meaning that they
are as likely as Whites to be eligible for jury service. By
improving their representation in the initial pool of jurors,
their representation on the eligible pools of jurors has also
improved. Asians (58.3%) and Hispanics (52.3%), on the other
hand, have substantially higher rates of ineligibility. Put
another way, more than half of all Asians and Hispanics who
are called for jury service are not eligible to serve. One notable
difference is that across the counties examined, Asians tend to
be overrepresented in the initial pool of jurors, and Hispanics
are not (when Hispanics are underrepresented in the initial
pool, the extent to which they are underrepresented in the eligible pool is compounded).
Table 4 provides, by race, the reasons why individuals
become “ineligible” for jury service. When we look at the reasons why Asians and Hispanics are ineligible for jury service,
data indicate that they are less likely to meet two of the primary requirements—not a U.S. citizen and do not read, speak,
or understand English. Whites on the other hand, primarily
become ineligible for jury service because they opt out (particularly in the category of being over the age of 65). Ineligibility
reasons for Blacks fall into two categories: not a U.S. citizen
(Nebraska has a large population of refugees from African
Nations) and opted out as being over the age of 65. For

TABLE 3: INELIGIBILITY BY RACE
WHITES

BLACKS

ASIANS

AM. INDIANS

HISPANIC

31.1%

31.6%

58.3%

32.8%

52.3%

13. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1601.
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TABLE 4: RACIAL BREAKDOWN OF REASONS FOR INELIGIBILITY
WHITES

BLACKS

ASIANS

AM. INDIANS

HISPANIC

REQUIREMENTS

21.5%

44.9%

88.4%

26.6%

84.5%

DISQUALIFIED

6.9%

13.9%

1.3%

22.4%

2.7%

OPTED OUT

71.6%

41.3%

10.3%

51.0%

12.8%

American Indians, the majority of those ineligible for jury service opted out (specifically, being over the age of 65 or having
an impairment).
In examining why Hispanics remain underrepresented in the
eligible pools of jurors, several explanations are possible. First,
as described above, Hispanics are significantly underrepresented in the initial pools of jurors, and the addition of stateidentification-card lists has not adequately raised their representation in the initial pool. Second, it is possible that the population of Hispanics who do not return a juror-qualification
form is growing. Third, it is possible that the population of ineligible Hispanics in the state is growing. Finally, anecdotal concerns have been expressed by jury commissioners about the
number of Hispanics claiming an inability to read, speak, or
understand English (particularly in situations where those individuals are known in the community to possess English skills).
These reports beg the question of whether the requirement
for English is being utilized as a convenient way for Hispanics
to “opt out” of jury service.14 At a minimum, these reports
have signaled the need for a process to determine English proficiency—in some counties, anyone who indicates on the juror
qualification form that they do not read, speak or understand
English is presumptively removed from consideration; in other
counties, judges or jury commissioners make these determinations on a case-by-case basis, albeit with no formal criteria.
The Committee will continue to monitor the representation of
the Hispanic population and has partnered with the Latino
American Commission to provide statewide education on the
importance of jury service.

While other jurisdictions may not face the same barriers
regarding periodic refreshment, measurement, or limited jurorsource lists, Nebraska’s experience of court-led reform demonstrates that courts can in fact develop policy and employ practices to reduce or mitigate the impact of nonsystematic factors
that result in the underrepresentation of minorities. Moreover,
the strategy of data-driven jury reform can be applied to other
types of nonsystematic exclusion.
For example, jurisdictions could re-evaluate the eligibility
criteria set forth to qualify someone as eligible for jury service.

In Nebraska a person who has been convicted of a criminal
offense punishable by imprisonment in a correctional facility
(which is highly correlated with race) when the conviction has
not been set aside or pardoned is not eligible for jury service,15
while in New Mexico a person who was convicted of a felony
and who met all other requirements for eligibility could be
summoned for jury service if the person had successfully completed all conditions of the sentence imposed for the felony,
including conditions for probation or parole.16 Moreover, a
large percentage of Hispanics and Asians in Nebraska are ineligible for jury service because they do not “read, speak, or
understand English.”17 In New Mexico, however, language
ability is not a criterion to determine eligibility for jury service18 and, in fact, court interpreters are provided to jurors
with limited English ability. Jurisdictions could also re-evaluate the informal and subjective processes by which eligibility
determinations are made (see discussion above regarding the
need to develop an objective and uniform way of determining
language ability).
Another potential area of inquiry is the extent to which
minorities are overrepresented in the pool of individuals with
undeliverable summonses (local migration rates are highly
correlated with socioeconomic status, which in turn is related
to minority status) and whether increased efforts to reduce
incorrect address information will yield more representative
pools. For example, the National Center for State Courts recommends that before summonsing prospective jurors, staff
verify and correct their addresses using the National Change of
Address (NCOA) database available through the U.S. Postal
Service.19 States with county-based systems will likely find that
the efforts and practices in place to deliver summonses initially
returned for inaccurate address information will differ greatly
from county to county.
Efforts can also be taken to reduce failure to appear for jury
service. Research in other contexts suggests that failure-toappear rates are higher for racial and ethnic minorities than
they are for Whites.20 The National Center for State Courts recommends that a timely second summons or notice typically
reduces the nonresponse or failure-to-appear rate by 24% to
46%.21 Research by the University of Nebraska Public Policy
Center indicates that providing information about what would

14. While the numbers of Asians who are ineligible for jury service for
not being a citizen and for language ability are nearly identical,
the number of Hispanics who are ineligible for jury service for
language reasons is about 10% higher than the number who are
ineligible for citizenship reasons.
15. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1601.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-5-1.
17. See text at notes 13-14 supra.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-5-1.

19. The National Center for State Courts’ Center for Jury Studies
maintains an online resource, Best Practices in Jury System
Management, which is available at http://www.ncsc.org/servicesand-experts/areas-of-expertise/jury-management.aspx.
20. Brian Bornstein, Alan Tomkins & Elizabeth Neeley, Reducing
Courts’ Failure to Appear Rate: A Procedural Justice Approach
(2010) (United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice
Programs. National Institute of Justice, 2008-IJ-CX-0022).
21. See Best Practices, supra note 19.
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happen if a misdemeanor defendant failed to appear (i.e., possible sanctions) significantly decreases failure-to-appear rates.
Given research by the American Judicature Society indicating
that the single biggest predictor of nonresponse rates to jury
summonses is the jurors’ expectations about what would happen if they failed to appear,22 it is likely that the threat of sanctions on the initial summons would also increase response
rates, particularly for minority populations.
Given the diversity of statutory frameworks and formal and
informal juror-compilation processes, it is likely nonsystematic
exclusion factors can continue to be identified and addressed
to produce more representative juries. Progress, however, is
dependent on judicial leadership to examine and address these
issues and research partnerships to effectively determine the
direction and impact of reforms.

22. ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE
SUMMONSES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1998).
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The International Criminal Court:
Our Differences in Jurisprudence
David Admire

O

n July 1, 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC)
became operational following establishment by the
Rome Statute.1 The Court is made up of the
Presidency, an Appeals Division, a Trial Division, Pre-Trial
Division, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.2 The
purpose of the Court is to provide a means to bring to justice
the perpetrators of “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community . . . .”3 The crimes within the jurisdiction of the court are the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.4 To date, no
crime of aggression has been charged.
One case is pending before the Pre-Trial Division5 and six
cases are being tried before a Trial Chamber,6 leaving eleven
cases where the defendants are at large and warrants have been
issued for their arrests7 and two cases where a Pre-Trial
Chamber refused to confirm charges.8 The jurisprudence of
the ICC results from the decisions in these cases by the PreTrial, Trial, and Appeals Divisions interpreting the Statute of
Rome, the Elements of Crimes, and the Court’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. Following that, the Court may look
to applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law. Lastly, the Court may under certain circumstances
review the national law of states.9

The major role of the Pre-Trial Chamber once a defendant
has been brought before it is to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the prosecutor has brought forth “sufficient evidence
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged.”10 If the prosecutor has met
that burden, the Pre-Trial Chamber sends the defendant to the
Trial Chamber for trial.11 This process is similar to any probable-cause hearing in the United States. However, the confirmation decisions issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber are substantially different than those in the U.S. The confirmation deci-

sions are quite long, ranging, for example, from 157 pages in
Lubanga to 226 pages in Katanga and Ngudjolo.12 These decisions may contain a discussion of the factual background, preliminary evidentiary matters, material elements of the crimes,
and modes of liability. Each discussion is footnoted at great
length to the prosecution and defense briefs.13
The Pre-Trial Chamber in its confirmation decision in
Katanga and Ngudjolo in effect usurps the authority of the Trial
Chamber by setting forth the mode of criminal responsibility
that the prosecutor is bound to follow. The Statute of Rome
was carefully constructed to include virtually all methods of
criminal responsibility, and it states:
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another
person, regardless of whether that other person
is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of
such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission
of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists
in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its
commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime
by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional
and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the
criminal activity or criminal purpose of

Footnotes
1. ROME STATUTE OF THE I.C.C., 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
2. Id. at art. 34.
3. Id. at Preamble.
4. Id. at art. 5 (1).
5. The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11.
6. The Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08; The Prosecutor v.
Katanga & Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07; The Prosecutor v.
Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06; The Prosecutor v. Banda & Jerbo, ICC02/05-03/09; The Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11;
The Prosecutor v. Muthaura and Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11.
7. The Prosecutor v. Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09; The Prosecutor v.
Harun & Kushay, ICC-02/05-01/07; The Prosecutor v. Ntaganda,
ICC-01/04-02/06; The Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo &
Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05; The Prosecutor v. Hussein, ICC-

02/05-01/12; The Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, ICC01/11-01/11.
8. The Prosecutor v. Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09; The Prosecutor v.
Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10.
9. ROME STAT. art. 21 (1) (a)-(c).
10. Id. at art. 61 (7).
11. Id. at art. 61 (7) (a).
12. Decision on Confirmation of Charges, The Prosecutor v. Lubanga,
ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Jan. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf;
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, The Prosecutor v. Katanga
& Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Sept. 30
2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
571253.pdf.
13. See Id.

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER
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the group, where such activity or purpose
involves the commission of a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and
publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking
action that commences its execution by means
of a substantial step, but the crime does not
occur because of circumstances independent of
the person’s intentions. However, a person who
abandons the effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime
shall not be liable for punishment under this
Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if
that person completely and voluntarily gave up
the criminal purpose.14

has not done so. It appears the
The court may
Trial Chamber has ceded its
allow victims
authority to the Pre-Trial
Chamber to determine which
not only to be
mode of criminal responsibility
present at trial
is appropriate. It is interesting to
but also to
note that in Katanga and
Ngudjolo the court requested
participate as
briefs from the parties regarding
a party.
the mode of responsibility.19 No
decision was made on that issue,
and the case proceeded to trial. Closing arguments have been
completed and still this issue hangs over the case. Apparently
the court will resolve this issue when it renders a verdict.
TRIAL

A close review of this language indicates that criminal
responsibility exists for one’s own acts, acts done jointly with
or through another person, complicity, aiding or abetting, or
acting through a group of persons. Also, criminal responsibility exists based on actions or inactions as a commander.15
Furthermore, no indication shows one mode is more or less
serious than another because all modes are subject to the same
level of punishment.16 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber in
Katanga and Ngudjolo must have believed that actions contained in subsections (b), (c), and (d) were less serious than
those contained in subsection (a). In a tortured interpretation
of this subsection, the Pre-Trial Chamber devised a scheme
whereby an individual can be criminally liable for the acts of
another’s subordinates. This interpretation was clearly unnecessary because such acts are criminally liable under subsections (b), (c), or (d). The only reason for this interpretation is
that conviction under subsection (b), (c), or (d) was believed
to be less serious as an accessory rather than under subsection
(a) as a principal.
The practical effect of this determination is that the Trial
Chamber is now bound by the Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirmation of charges, which includes this mode of liability.
Furthermore, this mode of liability was not the method of proof
that was desired by the prosecutor, which in effect also binds
the prosecutor’s hands.17 In summary, the Pre-Trial Chamber
exceeded its authority while limiting the options of both the
prosecutor and the judges who would try the case. While a Trial
Chamber has the authority to act as a Pre-Trial Chamber,18 it

Trials are held before three-judge panels at the ICC.20
Because judges elected to the ICC bench are not required to
have judicial experience,21 two of the eight judges assigned to
the Trial Division have no judicial experience and little if any
trial experience.22 The drafters of the Rome Statute desired that
2/3 of the judges have experience as a judge, prosecutor, or
advocate. The remaining judges should have expertise in international law, which results in many of those judges being academics. Obviously, the skill sets necessary to be an academic
and a judge are significantly different.
Trials at the ICC contain factors that simply to do not exist
in most American courtrooms. Because the official languages
of the court are both French and English, participants in the
trial may speak one language but not the other. As a result, the
court must have significant electronic facilities such that each
counsel, judge, and other participant has available headphones
to hear the statements of those at trial as those statements are
translated by a group of interpreters. In Katanga and Ngudjolo,
the Congolese witnesses also need interpreters. This obviously
slows down the trial process.
Another interesting aspect of the ICC is the prominent role
of victims. The court is required to take appropriate measures
to assure the physical and mental well-being of victims.23 The
court may allow victims not only to be present at trial but also
to participate as a party. Witnesses are entitled to be represented by counsel, who may question witnesses during trial
and call their own witnesses.24 This substantial difference
between trials in American courts and the ICC carries the danger of a victim’s counsel acting in effect as a second prosecutor.
Their participation increases the length of the trial to the detriment of the defendant who is in custody.

14. ROME STAT. art. 25 (3).
15. Id. at art. 28.
16. Id. at art. 77.
17. See Katanga, supra note 12, at para. 469.
18. ROME STAT. art. 64 (6) (a).
19. See Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief on the Interpretation of Art. 25
(3) (a), Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1541 (Oct. 19, 2009), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/
situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104
%200107/court%20records/filing%20of%20the%20participants/of

fice%20of%20the%20prosecutor/1541?lan=fr-FR.
20. ROME STAT. art. 39 (2) (b) (ii) & art. 61 (11).
21. Id. at art. 36 (3) (b).
22. See Structure of the Court: Trial Division, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the
%20court/chambers/trial%20division/trial%20division?lan=enGB (last visited Feb. 27, 2012) (supplying biographical information of the trial division judges).
23. ROME STAT. art. 68 (1).
24. Id. at art. 68 (3).
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Like in the U.S., defendants
are entitled to be represented
by counsel. These attorneys
are paid by the court.25 The
defense’s costs, which include
multiple attorneys, investigators, and support staff, are
staggering. In Katanga and
Ngudjolo, the 2008 budget for
each defendant was 472,459
and 442,309 euros, respectively.26 The conversion rate to
U.S. dollars is approximately $614,196 and $575,001.

The ICC's approach
to the admission
of hearsay . . .
leaves the
Rome Statute's
guarantee of
confrontation
tenuous.

decisions in that it is completely footnoted as to facts, prosecution and defense positions, and the court’s decision. Each one of
these proposed decisions must be drafted and circulated among
the judges for review, changes, and agreement. These decisions
can be lengthy from a U.S. perspective.29 The process is more
akin to an appellate court proceeding. Delay can also be attributed to the lack of trial or judicial experience among the judges.
The jurisprudence of the ICC has interesting differences
from the U.S. system. For example, the Rome Statute lists a
series of defendant’s rights that are similar to rights guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution; however, when one delves into the
decisions of the court, it becomes obvious that stark differences exist. Clearly the right to a speedy trial discussed above
is one of those.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

SPEEDY TRIAL
As a result of the confirmation practices of the Pre-Trial
Chamber, the length of time existing between arrest and trial
is certainly a concern. For example, Thomas Lubanga was
taken into custody on March 17, 2006, charges were confirmed on January 29, 2007, and his trial began on January 26,
2009. He was found guilty on March 14, 2012, but has yet to
be sentenced. Germain Katanga was placed in custody on
October 17, 2007. Matthieu Ngudjolo was taken into custody
February 6, 2008. The charges were confirmed on September
30, 2008, and trial began on November 24, 2009. Jean-Pierre
Bemba was taken into custody on May 24, 2008, the confirmation of charges was issued on June 15, 2009, and trial commenced on November 22, 2010.27 None of these trials have
concluded. The ICC is required to bring defendants to trial
without undue delay;28 however, these time frames, ranging
from 21 months to nearly 3 years, do not square with U.S.
concepts of a speedy trial.
As discussed above, the participation of witnesses creates
delay. How the court schedules its calendar also affects this
delay. For example, the Katanga and Ngudjolo trial is held in
either morning or afternoon sessions. The remaining time is left
for other court business. Much of that business is another interesting facet of the ICC that adds to the delay in reaching a final
determination. While some decisions on motions before the
Trial Chamber are issued from the bench, many are written.
Each decision is written in the same format as confirmation

CONFRONTATION/HEARSAY
One of the strongest protections provided to a criminal
defendant and embodied in the Sixth Amendment is the right
to confront the witnesses upon whose testimony the state
relies for conviction. This provision assures a defendant that he
or she may test through cross-examination a witness’s truthfulness. Furthermore, the confrontation clause allows a defendant to examine the accuracy of a witness, the witness’s memory, and the meaning and sincerity of the witness’s testimony.
Without this protection, there lies a real and ever-present danger that an individual could be wrongfully convicted.
Within the ICC’s founding document rests an apparently
similar provision to the Sixth Amendment.30 This provision
indicates a defendant shall have minimum guarantees, including “[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him or her . . . .” While this subsection appears to be relatively straightforward, when one examines the decisions of the
ICC, it is apparent that this protection is illusory at best.
The ICC’s approach to the admission of hearsay and its
reliance on judges determining the probative value of hearsay
evidence leaves the Rome Statute’s guarantee of confrontation
tenuous. The ICC has found first that the exclusion of hearsay
evidence is not expressly provided by the Statute.31
Furthermore, in Katanga and Ngudjolo, the Pre-Trial Chamber
determined that “any challenges to hearsay evidence may
affect its probative value, but not its admissibility.”32 The
chamber did address confrontation and the determination of

25. Id. at art. 67 (1) (b).
26. Report on Different Legal Aid Mechanisms Before International
Criminal Jurisdictions, ICC-ASP/7/23 (Oct. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP7/ICC-ASP-723%20English.pdf.
27. See Situations and Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Cases/
(last visited 27 Feb. 2012) (supplying dates of apprehension).
28. ROME STAT. art. 67 (1) (c).
29. See Corrigendum to Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony of Witness P-02 and
Accompanying Video Excerpts, Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-2289Corr-Red, Trial Chamber II, (Aug. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/F7695FFB-40B0-4231-A3B740C915B556CA.htm; Order in Relation to Disclosure of Identity
of P-143, Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1817, Trial Chamber II, (Feb.

1, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/
AA43436E-8447-42DA-8942-AF1C6E716A5B.htm; Decision of
the Communication of P-316’s Statement, Katanga, ICC-01/0401/00-1728-Red, Trial Chamber II, (Dec. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%2
00107/court%20records/chambers/trial%20chamber%20ii/1728?l
an=en-GB.
30. ROME STAT. art. 67(1) (e).
31. Decision Regarding Protocol on Practices to be Used to Prepare
Witnesses for Trial, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 at para. 41, Trial
Chamber I (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc494990.pdf.
32. Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Katanga, supra note 12, at
para. 137.
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probative value when it stated “the parties’ inability to crossexamine a Prosecution source is simply one factor in the
Chamber’s determination of the probative value accorded to
the evidence in question.”33 The ICC also looks to the text of
the Rome Statute and its own rules of evidence for its position
that the Chamber can consider this type of evidence.34 If one
examines Article 69 (3), the second sentence states: “The
Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all
evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of
the truth.”35 The ICC and other national jurisdictions have a
strong reliance on appropriate judicial determination of probative value to obtain the truth, while in U.S. courts, the hearsay
rule makes this determination unnecessary because trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement is found to be inherently
lacking unless it falls within an exception to the rule. In the
U.S., every law student has drilled into him or her the importance of the confrontation clause and underlying reason for the
hearsay rule. Instead, the ICC views this as a hindrance to the
determination of the truth.
A recent decision by Trial Chamber III in Bemba once again
provides insight into the immense differences in jurisprudence
between the U.S. and the ICC. In a 17-page decision, the court
admitted as prima facie evidence all documents submitted by
the prosecutor before the start of the presentation of evidence.36 The Court distinguished admission of evidence and
the probative value to be given it at the end of the trial. The
Court justified its action as ensuring the proper conduct of the
trial. Furthermore, the court believed that the drafters of the
Statute wanted to avoid the “technical formalities of the common law system of admissibility of evidence in favour of the
flexibility of the civil law system . . . .”37 Fortunately, this
decision was reversed on appeal.38 Twelve of the eighteen
judges at the ICC come from civil-law systems.39 This mixture
of civil-law and common-law judges creates its own set of
problems as the court attempts to provide a coherent approach
to trial and criminal procedure.
The result of these conflicting views is apparent. In the U.S.,
a defendant has protection under our Constitution and the
rules of evidence. At the ICC, in contrast, a defendant is at the
mercy of a judge’s determination of probative value without the
safeguards of cross-examination and rules limiting the admission of evidence.
REASONABLE DOUBT/DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Another interesting difference in jurisprudence is our con-

cept of reasonable doubt.
It is interesting
Without considering the definito compare the
tion of this term, most jurisdictions in the U.S. require that a
ICC's view of
verdict be unanimous. Every double jeopardy
prosecutor and defense attorney
with that of U.S.
understands that a single juror
voting not guilty constitutes a
jurisdictions.
win for the defense.
The decisions of a Trial
Chamber at the ICC are made not by a jury, but rather by a
three-judge panel.40 Like in the U.S., those subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC are presumed innocent.41 The burden of
proof at the ICC is also beyond a reasonable doubt.42 However,
the two jurisdictions split on how sufficient proof is counted.
The Rome Statute urges the judges to seek unanimity, but if it
is lacking, a simple majority is sufficient to establish guilt.43
Therefore, a judge with strong doubts as to the veracity of
important witnesses or the probative value of evidence presented has no ability to affect the finding unless that individual can sway an additional judge to his or her point of view.
It is interesting to compare the ICC’s view of double jeopardy with that of U.S. jurisdictions. The Double Jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment has protected citizens from the
government’s attempt to obtain a conviction once a jury has
rendered a not-guilty verdict. Absent extreme circumstances, a
finding of not guilty by a jury simply prevents the retrial of a
criminal defendant for the same charge.
The Rome Statute provides defendants with an apparently
similar protection as that contained in the Fifth Amendment.
It reads: “Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall
be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which
formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.”44 The term “except as provided in this Statute” leads to the procedure for appeals within
the statute. After conviction, the prosecutor has the right to
appeal a procedural error, a factual error, or an error of law.45
While it is procedurally possible in the U.S. for a prosecutor to
obtain appellate review for errors in procedure and law, it is
nearly impossible to obtain review of the factual determination
made by the jury.
During the process of deliberation, a Trial Chamber must,
like juries in the U.S., weigh the evidence and issue a verdict.
It is required to issue a written decision, which contains a “full
and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber’s findings on the

33. Id. at para.109.
34. ROME STAT. art. 64 (9) (a); ICC Rules of Proc. & Evidence, Rule 63
(2).
35. Id. at 69 (3).
36. Decision on Admission into Evidence of Material Contained in
Prosecution’s List of Evidence, Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-1022,
Trial Chamber III, (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc969801.pdf.
37. Id. at para. 17.
38. Judgment on the appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled
“Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Materials Contained

in the Prosecution's List of Evidence," Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08
OA 5 OA 6, Appeals Chamber (May 3, 2011), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1066048.pdf
39. Judges Blattmann, Cotte, Diarra, Gurmendi, Kaul, Kourula, Odio
Benito, Steiner, Tarfusser, Trendafilova, Usacka, and Van den
Wyngaert.
40. ROME STAT. art. 39 (2) (b) (ii).
41. Id. at art. 66 (1).
42. Id. at art. 66 (3).
43. Id. at art. 74 (3).
44. Id. at art. 20 (1).
45. Id. at art. 81 (1) (a).
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evidence and conclusions.”46
It is from this decision that a
prosecutor may appeal a factual determination. The
options available to the
Appeals
Division
upon
review of the Trial Chamber’s
decision include ordering a
new trial before a different
Trial Chamber or reversing or
amending the decision.47 It
appears from this statutory
framework that the Appeals Division of the ICC can reverse a
finding of not guilty and enter a finding of guilty based on its
determination that the Trial Chamber made a mistake of fact.
In other words, judges who have not heard the live testimony
of the witnesses or had the opportunity to judge their credibility can enter a finding of guilty. While this apparent authority
vested in the Appeals Division is disconcerting, no indication
as yet shows whether it will be exercised.

If . . . evidence
was illegally
obtained, the court
must then engage
in a two-pronged
test to determine
if it will admit the
contested evidence.

EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the U.S., the exclusionary rule is a well-founded doctrine
designed to deter police violations of citizens’ constitutional
rights. During the drafting of the Rome Statute, a division
between common-law and civil-law advocates on the rules of
evidence existed. The final result was a “delicate combination”
of the two.48 The ICC’s founding document recognizes that evidence may be obtained in violation of accepted rules. It reads:
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this
Statute or internationally recognized human rights shall
not be admissible if:
• The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or
• The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the
integrity of the proceedings.49
If determined that evidence was illegally obtained, the court
must then engage in a two-pronged test to determine if it will
admit the contested evidence. The first prong relates to the reliability of evidence. If it is reliable, the violation has no bearing
on admissibility. The second prong suggests that serious damage to the integrity of the proceedings is the lynchpin upon
which a decision will be made. In Mapp v. Ohio,50 the United
States Supreme Court found that “the imperative of judicial
integrity” was one of the justifications for the application of the
exclusionary rule. More recently, the Court relied on the deter-

46. Id. at art. 74 (5).
47. Id. at art. 83 (2 ) (a)-(b).
48. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 294 (3d ed. 2007).
49. ROME STAT. art. 69 (7).
50. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
52. Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga, supra note 12, at
para. 82.

106 Court Review - Volume 47

rence of police misconduct as the prime justification.51
The Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga addressed the issue of
evidence it found to have been obtained in violation of recognized human rights.52 The Chamber, in discussing the issue of
“integrity of the proceedings,” stated: “. . . in the fight against
impunity, it must ensure an appropriate balance between the
rights of the accused and the need to respond to victims’ and
the international community’s expectations.”53 The Chamber
continued, indicating that exclusion would result only from
“serious human rights violation[s].”54 Like in the U.S., the
Chamber understood the difficulty in balancing the “contradictory and complex matters of principle.”55 The Trial
Chamber upheld the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on the
application of the exclusionary rule.56 Furthermore, the Trial
Chamber went on to question whether deterrence of illegal
police activity was a concern of the court.57 Clearly, the
jurisprudence of the ICC reflects the desire to leave in the
hands of the judges what evidence should be heard and what
weight is to be given such evidence.
WITNESS PREPARATION/WITNESS PROOFING
Preparing one’s witnesses for trial is a longstanding and
well-accepted practice among American lawyers. Rarely are
judges even involved in the process. It is not unusual for law
firms to have courtroom facilities within their offices so that
witness’s testimony can be rehearsed. At the ICC, this practice
is divided into two separate areas of witness familiarization and
witness preparation.
The court has approved the process of witness familiarization as an important practice for witnesses. That process
includes the following:
a. Assisting the witness to understand fully the Court
proceedings, its participants and their respective
roles;
b. Reassuring the witness about her role in proceedings
before the Court;
c. Ensuring that the witness clearly understands she is
under a strict legal obligation to tell the truth when
testifying;
d. Explaining to the witness the process of examination
first by the Prosecution and subsequently by the
Defence;
e. Discussing matters that are related to the security and
safety of the witness in order to determine the necessity of applications for protective measures before the
Court; and
f. Making arrangements with the Prosecution in order to
provide the witness with an opportunity to acquaint

53. Id. at para. 86.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Decision on Admission of Material from “Bar Table,” Lubanga,
ICC-01/04-01/06-1981 at para. 48, Trial Chamber I (June 24,
2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ doc
702244.pdf.
57. Id. at. para. 45.

herself with the Prosecution’s Trial Lawyer and others
who may examine the witness in Court.58
However, the court takes a very different view from
American practices when it comes to witness preparation.
While recognizing that many national jurisdictions and other
international criminal tribunals allow witness preparation, the
Trial Chamber in Lubanga charted a different course for the
ICC. While the Chamber allowed a witness to review a previously written statement, it forbade counsel from discussing
other topics or evidence. The court stated:
. . . the Trial Chamber is not convinced that either
greater efficiency or the establishment of the truth will
be achieved by [witness preparation]. Rather, it is the
opinion of the Chamber that this could lead to a distortion of the truth and may come dangerously close to constituting a rehearsal of in-court testimony. . . . A
rehearsed witness may not provide the entirety or the
true extent of his memory or knowledge of a subject, and
the Trial Chamber would wish to hear the totality of an
individual’s recollection. . . . Finally, the Trial Chamber
is of the opinion that the preparation of witness testimony by parties prior to trial may diminish what would
otherwise be helpful spontaneity during the giving of
evidence by a witness. The spontaneous nature of testimony can be of paramount importance to the Court’s
ability to find the truth, and the Trial Chamber is not
willing to lose such an important element in the proceedings.59
Obviously, that Chamber believes witness preparation is not
conducive to finding the truth. Contrary to standard American
legal thought, many questions will be asked without counsel
knowing what the answer will be.

58. “Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise
Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial,” Lubanga, ICC-01/1401/06-1049, Trial Chamber I (Nov. 30, 2007), para. 29.

CONCLUSION

The jurisprudence of the ICC is a work in progress. It is a
daunting task to establish a framework to try some of the most
notorious crimes occurring throughout the world. The court
works at a disadvantage because some judges lack judicial or
trial experience. It is especially difficult given the differences
existing between the civil-law and common-law systems in the
approach to and conduct of trials. Clearly that court relies
heavily on judges weighing the evidence—some of which
would not be admitted in the U.S. It is also apparent that some
of the constitutional rights afforded individuals in the U.S.,
which appear to be protected by the Statute of Rome, are in fact
not protected.
The mission of the ICC is to assure that the most serious
crimes are punished, to end the impunity for those who commit such crimes, and to give voice and protection to victims.
The court’s success in achieving these goals remains to be seen.
Only time will tell whether the decisions made will obtain
international acceptance and approval. Until the court has a
proven history of acceptable court management and jurisprudence, one must expect that countries such as the U.S., China,
and Russia will not submit to its jurisdiction.
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Procedural Fairness
for Judges and Courts
http://proceduralfairness.org
There’s now a place on the web to find
all the basics about procedural fairness,
along with the latest research, how these
concepts have been implemented, and
additional resources that will be of use to
judges. On the site, you can find:
• Quick access to the AJA’s White Paper
on Procedural Fairness, as well as the
special issue of Court Review on the
topic.
• Tips for judges on how to incorporate
procedural-fairness concepts into a
judge’s daily work. (Tip #1: “Join the
American Judges Association, which
has for the past several years been leading judges toward better proceduralfairness practices.”)
• Separate tips for court administrators,
whose support is essential.
• Recent lectures—including video and
PowerPoint slides—on proceduralfairness concepts from Yale law and
psychology professor Tom Tyler, the
leading academic researcher in this
field for more than two decades.
The website is designed to provide easy
access to theoretical and practical materials on procedural fairness.
Click on the tab “Procedural Fairness
Theory” to see how research in the area
has developed into a coherent theory that
shows how paying attention to procedural-fairness concepts improves public
acceptance of courts in general and compliance with court orders in particular. A
three-part lecture from Professor Tyler
shows how perceptions of institutional
legitimacy, which are rooted in procedural-justice principles, are central to
individual decisions to adhere to a society’s rules.
Click on the tab “Relevant Research” to
see specific research in areas like specialized courts, juvenile justice, and media108 Court Review - Volume 47

tion. Or click on the tab “Resources” to
see specific tips for judges and court
administrators.
The procedural-fairness website has
been put together by Professor Tyler,
National Center for State Courts
researcher David Rottman, current AJA
president Kevin Burke, and Court Review
coeditor Steve Leben.
Procedural-Fairness Blog
http://proceduralfairnessblog.org
There’s a procedural-fairness blog that
complements the website. The blog has
an active discussion on procedural-fairness issues, as well as its own links to
recent papers in the field (including some
published only on the blog or the procedural-fairness website).
The primary bloggers are the founders
of the procedural-fairness website: Yale
law and psychology professor Tom Tyler,
National Center for State Courts
researcher David Rottman, current AJA
president Kevin Burke, and Court Review
coeditor Steve Leben. But guest bloggers
are also welcome—if you’d like to comment on something related to procedural
fairness, click on the heading for “Guest
Blog Posts” and get in touch.
Anything that relates to procedural
fairness—as practiced or perceived—is
fair game on this blog. Recent blog entries
have included:
• An appraisal in April of the fairness of
the United States Supreme Court’s oral
argument in the healthcare cases, followed by a reaction to its opinion—
from a procedural-fairness perspective—when it was released in late June.
• “Good Judging Often Starts with Good
Listening”—some thoughts about how
judges might improve their listening
skills and why that could be important.
• “Where to Start?”—advice for the
judge or court administrator starting
down the road toward exploring procedural fairness in court.
• “The Value of Video”—discussing how
individual judges might use video of
their work on the bench to improve
performance, much as the amateur (or
professional) golfer might improve a

golf swing through watching it on
video.
• “Procedural Fairness on Appeal”—a
guest blog from Minnesota appellate
judge Francis J. Connolly providing
practical ways appellate courts might
improve perceptions of procedural fairness on appeal.
All of the blog entries are open for
comment.
The AJA Blog
http://blog.amjudges.org
Court Review is published quarterly,
but events of interest to judges happen all
the time. Current AJA President Kevin
Burke has started a blog that fills the gap.
Almost anything that’s important to
judges is likely to be touched on in the
blog, often with links to new reports, articles of interest, or other websites with
more information.
Recent blog entries have included:
• Updates on the court-funding crisis,
with links to commentaries about
problems in funding courts in Florida,
New York, and Canada (including a
speech by Chief Justice Robert Bauman
of the Supreme Court of British
Columbia).
• A summary of a new report from
Justice at Stake, The New Politics of
Judicial Elections 2009-2010, which
found that the rise in noncandidate TV
advertising made the 2010 election
cycle the costliest nonpresidential election ever for TV spending in judicial
elections. The blog provided a link for
downloading the report, as well as a
separate link to a Joyce Foundation
report on money and politics.
• A report of a recent speech by Florida
Bar President Scott G. Hawkins, who
suggested that justices of the Florida
Supreme Court may be targeted by
opposition groups in 2012.
• A three-step action plan for reducing
the chance that a rampant rumor mill
will take over your courthouse.
• Guest commentaries, including ones
on judicial wellness and court leadership.

